

Iraq:- The Way Forward
A Political Strategy To Win & End the War In Iraq

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ABSTRACT

The challenges to stability, unity, and democracy in Iraq are typically characterized as factional (sectarian and ethnic) or as struggle against the presence of foreign troops. However, this assumption remains largely erroneous. The problems and challenges in Iraq are actually and overwhelmingly the result of power struggles, and the competition for resources by political elites, and dominant political factions.

The political and electoral system emplaced in Iraq incentivizes elites and political entities to undertake factional identities; in doing so, it promotes identity politics. The current system also fails to filter the contests for power through the electoral system. As such, fragmentation within the government is maximized, and the political system in Iraq becomes one that promotes extremism and incorporates extremist views, thus, creating paralysis and hindering progress.

Consequently, this study proposes redesigning the Iraqi electoral system in a way that compels elites to secure cross-factional support. Such an approach will force political elites and candidates to undertake median and moderate approaches to win and will promote moderate

elites who must gain the support of the people. This will allow reconciliation efforts to progress steadily and will put Iraq on the right path for consolidating its nascent democracy. Vitaly important, such a system will provide for democratic consolidation and sustainability without the need of external interference. The challenge, however, is in deciding how to introduce such an institutional redesign due to entrenched interests of parties and elites that are served under the current system.

The current political system in Iraq is parliamentarian; it follows the concept of infusion of powers and is based on “consensus” and informal consociation. The electoral system in Iraq is a closed-party-list proportional representation. This study proposes an alternative political and electoral system. As a substitute political system, this study proposes a hybrid system that largely follows the concept of separation of powers. Under this system the chief executive—as opposed to the head of state—will be directly elected by the people through a customized majoritarian system that conditions victory in elections not only on achieving 50+% of the vote, but also on achieving certain thresholds in 16 out of the 18 Iraqi provinces. Thus, only candidates who are acceptable to all the “components” of Iraqi society will assume the responsibility of governing Iraq.

The Presidency Council—the head of state—can follow the consociational principle, and remain as it is now. At present, the presidency council in Iraq—which will give over power to a President in the next elections—consists of a President and two Vice Presidents. The presidency council’s members are representatives of the three major components of the Iraqi society—Shiite, Sunni, and, Kurd. This can remain unchanged, voted in by parliament. In fact, preserving this would check the strong Prime Minister proposed under this system. As such, transparency, accountability, decisiveness, and cohesion, will be combined with oversight.

As for elections to the legislature, this study proposes to convert the electoral rules to single-member districts. Districts must be delineated in such a way that candidates will largely compete against people of their own (sectarian or ethnic) identity. Hence, candidates will be unable to invoke their identities as credentials to win elections. Where possible, minorities in districts will be included so that serious candidates competing against others from their-own identity will be forced to appeal also to people other than their identities. This will further compel candidates to undertake moderate stands.

Essentially, the proposed system enhances the accountability of elected officials to the electorate; it promotes substantive politics rather than descriptive politics in Iraq; and it allows for the steady consolidation

of democracy. The proposed system also maintains unity within the executive branch, and opens the way for reconciliation, reconstruction, the provision of services and security, and political stability.

Table of Contents:

Introduction 1

Chapter I: The Essence of the Problem in Iraq and Means To Mitigate It 11

Chapter II: The Political and Electoral System in Post Saddam’s Iraq—Flawed And Malfunctioning 18

Chapter III: *History—A Source For Lessons, And, Remedies* . 50

Chapter IV: Reforming the Iraqi Electoral system 60

Conclusion..... 82

Bibliography 107

The strategic objective of Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) was to establish constitutional democracy in a unified and stable Iraq, and to facilitate the Iraqi society's embrace of free market capitalism as well as social moderation, tolerance, and pluralism, to include respect for human, minority and women's rights. The international policy vision informing the plan was to institute changes that would start a domino effect of democratization cascading throughout the Middle East.¹

Operation Iraqi Freedom after a spectacular success in the initial military phase, turned into a chronic security problem,² and after more than six years, has yet to achieve its objectives.³ There remain many security challenges in Iraq, for example: sectarian and ethnic tensions are rampant, and serious human rights violations remain very common:⁴

¹ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, First ed. (New York: Random House Inc., Pantheon Books, 2006). 73 & 433. And: Peter W. Galbraith, *The End of Iraq* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2006). 5, 9 & 10.

² Colonel Jabbar Naeemah Karam, "Post-Transition Violence in Iraq (2004-2005): The Military Perspective of an Insider" (U.S. Army War College, 2006). 5.

³ James A. Baker III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report* (United States Institute for Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Center for the Study of the Presidency (CSP), and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, 2006). 9 "Saddam Hussein has been removed from power and the Iraqi people have a democratically elected government that is broadly representative of Iraq's population, yet the government is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or delivering essential services. The level of violence is high and growing. There is great suffering"

⁴ "Iraq: Torture Continues at Hands of New Government : Police Systematically Abusing Detainees", Human Rights Watch <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/01/24/iraq-torture-continues-hands-new-government> (accessed 03/29/ 2009). And: Peter Beaumont, "Abuse Worse Than under Saddam, Says Iraqi Leader," *The Guardian*, 11/27/ 2005. And: *Human Rights Report 1 January - 30 June 2008*, (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), 2008). 2 "grave human rights violations that are less widely reported, and the elimination of which requires long-term political commitment remain

The country appears heading towards a theocracy rather than a democracy,⁵ and, acts of violence committed by non-state actors in all of its forms—terrorism,⁶ insurgency,⁷ and, militias—are still very much of a threat to Iraq’s stability.⁸

Everyone knowledgeable of the situation recognizes that politics is at the heart of such challenges and forms of violence.⁹ As presented by the Iraq Study groups:

unaddressed.” And: "Un: Human Rights Abuses in Iraq Still Widespread ", Voice of America <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-12/2008-12-02-voa66.cfm?CFID=152390694&CFTOKEN=29163464&jsessionid=883095ddcec5e6eb8640343c664b3c2f78b5> (accessed 03/26/ 2009). And: III and others. 13 “Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage in sectarian violence, including the unnecessary detention, torture, and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. The police are organized under the Ministry of the Interior, which is confronted by corruption and militia infiltration and lacks control over police in the provinces.” And: "Iraqi V.P. Calls for Forming Nat'L Gov'T to Salvage Country", Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) <http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1958809&Language=en> (accessed 01/28/ 2009). Reported that Iraqi Vice President Tarik Al-Hashimi “noted that human rights conditions in Iraq were ‘regrettable.’” And: *Hope and Fear: Human Rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*, (Amnesty International 2009).

⁵ Peter Grier, "Democracy's Push, Theocracy's Pull - in War's Wake: Is the Middle East Bound for Resurgence of Radical Islam?," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 04/24/ 2003. and, "Iraq's Permanent Constitution: Analysis and Recommendations ", United States Commission on International Religious Freedom http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1888&Itemid=1 (accessed). And, Darrell Williams, "Iraq Is Now a Shiite Islamic Theocracy, Thanks to Bush", *American Chronicle* <http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/40367> (accessed 10/29 2008).

⁶ *Human Security Brief 2006*, (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia - LIU Institute For Global Issues, 2006). 3.

⁷ *Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq*, General David H. Petraeus Commander, *Multi-National Force-Iraq*, (Washington DC, 2007). 2.

⁸ *Ibid.* 2.

⁹ *Counterinsurgency Operations Field Manual-Interim No. 3-07.22*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2004). 1-1 and: "Testimony of Dr. Ahmed S. Hashim," in *U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, The Senate (Washington D.C.:

If the Iraqi government moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be enhanced in an important part of the world, and America's credibility, interests, and values will be protected.¹⁰

In January 2007, former President George W. Bush announced a military surge to provide a "breathing space" for the Iraqi political progress.¹¹ Eventually, the security situation improved in Iraq.¹² Experts inside and outside of government agree that the progress in Iraq is remarkable¹³ (see figures 1, 2, 3).

2004). 2&3 and: Bob Woodward, *The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008* (New York: Simon & Schuster 2008). 234 the Defense Department team's

¹⁰ III and others. 6.

¹¹ "Transcript of President Bush's Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq," *New York Times*, 01/11/ 2007. 1. Also see: "Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq", National Defense University - Military Education Research Library Network (MERLN) <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/iraq/WH/20070110-3.pdf> (accessed 02/28/ 2009). This is an abstraction the surge was one factor. However, the remaining actors are irrelevant to this paper. and see: Woodward. 213.

¹² *Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, General David H. Petraeus Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq*. 1. And: Guy Raz, "Gates: Political Developments in Iraq Discouraging," *NPR*, 08/03/ 2007. See also: "War in Iraq, Plan for Ending the War in Iraq - the Problem", BarackObama.com <http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/iraq/> (accessed 11/18/ 2008). And: "Remarks of President Barack Obama - Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq (Camp Lejeune, North Carolina)", The White House http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/ (accessed 02/28/ 2009). "Thanks in great measure to your service, the situation in Iraq has improved. Violence has been reduced substantially from the horrific sectarian killing of 2006 and 2007. Al Qaeda in Iraq has been dealt a serious blow by our troops and Iraq's Security Forces, and through our partnership with Sunni Arabs. The capacity of Iraq's Security Forces has improved, and Iraq's leaders have taken steps toward political accommodation. The relative peace and strong participation in January's provincial elections sent a powerful message to the world about how far Iraqis have come in pursuing their aspirations through a peaceful political process. But let there be no doubt: Iraq is not yet secure, and there will be difficult days ahead. Violence will continue to be a part of life in Iraq." And: James Kirkup, "Iraq: Basra Is Less Dangerous Than Manchester, British General Says," *Daily Telegraph*, 02/07/ 2009.

This progress, whether on the security or the political levels, is the result of tireless efforts and external pressures mainly exerted by the United States over Iraqi political elites,¹⁴ with numerous benchmarks and milestones imposed.¹⁵ The necessity of these actions indicates that the progress is not sustainable:¹⁶ military commanders and top American officials in Iraq fear an eventual collapse in Iraq,¹⁷ and analysts agree

¹³ Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O'Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Evolution of Iraq Strategy," in *Restoring the Balance a Middle East Strategy for the Next President* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution and The Council on Foreign Relations 2008). 27 and: Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, *The Second Cold War and Corporate Security* (Strasfor, 2008). iii.

¹⁴ Woodward. 188 "most state institutions were minimally functional without U.S. direction and support," 191, 200, 211, & 216.

¹⁵ Ibid. 256 and: "U.S. Aircraft Opens Fire on Sons of Iraq Members," *The Washington Post*, 04/03/ 2009. "Under heavy pressure from the U.S. military, the Shiite-led Iraqi government agreed to assume responsibility for the payments to the predominantly Sunni armed groups and absorb some of them into its security forces. But in recent weeks, several Sons of Iraq groups have disintegrated and some members have rejoined the insurgency, saying the government has failed to pay them on time and has been slow to admit them into police academies."

¹⁶ Woodward. 192 & 237 David Gordon the representative from the Intelligence community's opinion and: Thomas E. Ricks, "The War in Iraq Isn't Over. The Main Events May Not Even Have Happened Yet.," *The Washington Post*, 02/15/ 2009. And: Mustafa Mahmoud, "Feud Delays Iraq Committee Kirkuk Recommendations," *Reuters*, 03/29/ 2009. And: Charles Levinson, "Toll Rises as Iraq Slows Surge," *Wall Street Journal*, 05/08/ 2009. "Violence is on the rise in Iraq as American troops withdraw. A ground-level look at the handover provides one explanation: The Iraqi government is neglecting many of the successful counterinsurgency initiatives it is inheriting from the U.S. military."

¹⁷ "Pentagon Brass Chafes at Obama's Iraq Pullout Plan," *The Daily Star*, 02/03/ 2009. And: "Submitted Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee - as Submitted by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Room Sd-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., Tuesday, January 27, 2009 ", U.S. Department of Defense <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337> (accessed 01/29/ 2009). And: Peter Baker and Thom Shanker, "Obama Meets with Officials on Iraq, Signaling His Commitment to Ending War " *The New York Times*, 01/21/ 2009. And: Peter Baker and Alissa J. Rubin, "Obama Pledge on Iraq Encounters Opposition," *International Herald Tribune*, 01/29/ 2009. And: Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, "Military Planners, in Nod to Obama, Are Preparing for a Faster Iraq Withdrawal," *The New York Times*, 01/14/ 2009. And: Martin Sieff, "Obama Imposes His New Plans on Iraq, Afghan Wars," *United Press International, Inc.*, 01/27/ 2009.

that the progress in Iraq remains “fragile and reversible.”¹⁸ Essentially, now as previously, the political progress remains the major hurdle in achieving the strategic objective of OIF.¹⁹ The Baker/Hamilton Iraq Study group summarized:

There is widespread Iraqi, American, and international agreement on the key issues confronting the Iraqi government: national reconciliation, including the negotiation of a “political deal” among Iraq’s sectarian groups on Constitution review, de-Baathification, oil revenue sharing ... the future of Kirkuk, and amnesty; security, particularly curbing militias ... and governance, including the provision of

Military commanders, expert bureaucrats, and civil servants. They have argued against the preferences of the President and provided other alternatives. General Raymond Odierno the Commanding General of the Multi National Forces in Iraq and highest ranking General there, General David Petraeus the CENTCOM commander. And, Secretary Gates aligns himself with the military commanders, fearing a collapse in Iraq. In general, top and middle ranking military officers in Iraq see a quick withdrawal from Iraq as destabilizing, and would reverse gains achieved in that country. And: Anthony Shadid, "Departing U.S. Envoy in Iraq Sees Risks Ahead - Crocker Warns against Abrupt Troop Withdrawal," *The Washington Post*, 01/23/ 2009. Ryan Crocker who recently left his post in Iraq as the American Ambassador, strongly warned of some “very serious risks” that a hasty troops withdrawal from Iraq entails. These risks were summarized as: security breakdown, a reversal of the political progress that has been made, and, chaos. Crocker warned that such a withdrawal would send the wrong message to the Iraqi people and political factions, which would force them to go back and entrench themselves in order to be prepared of what is next.

¹⁸ Shadid. And: Burton and Stewart. Iv and: Michael J. Sodaro, *Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction* 3rd Edition ed. (New York: McGraw Hill Companies, 2008). 267. And: Biddle, O’Hanlon, and Pollack. 29

¹⁹ "Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq (Camp Lejeune, North Carolina)", (accessed). And: "U.S. To Be 'More Aggressive' with Iraq on Political Reform," *AFP*, 02/27/ 2009. And: Raz. And: "War in Iraq, Plan for Ending the War in Iraq - the Problem", (accessed). “despite the improved security situation, the Iraqi government has not stepped forward to lead the Iraqi people and to reach the genuine political accommodation that was the stated purpose of the surge ... the absence of genuine political accommodation in Iraq.” And: Matthew Duss and Peter Juul, *The Fractured Shia of Iraq: Understanding the Tensions within Iraq’s Majority* (Washington DC: Center for American Progress, January 2009). 2 “The U.S. troop surge in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 was intended to provide the political space for reconciliation among the Kurds and Sunni and Shia Arabs, which remains elusive.”

basic services and the rollback of pervasive corruption.²⁰

Since taking power in January 2009, the Obama administration has been shifting from the military and security aspects²¹ to focus primarily on the political progress in Iraq. President Obama recognized that “the long-term solution in Iraq must be political – not military”²² and summarized the challenges in the statement: “too many fundamental political questions about Iraq’s future remain unresolved”²³ Vice President Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr has also emphasized a political approach to end the war on Iraq²⁴ in his remarks “the United States would prod Iraq's government on forging political reform.”²⁵ He said that the US has to be “much more aggressive ... forcing Iraqis to deal with those issues.”²⁶ Ambassador Christopher Hill stated that his priority in Iraq would be “buttressing its still-shaky government.”²⁷

²⁰ III and others. 16. Also see: Woodward. 223.

²¹ "Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq (Camp Lejeune, North Carolina)", (accessed). “President Barack Obama announced his plan to end the war in Iraq. By August 31, 2010 the US “combat mission in Iraq will end.” And, by the end of 2011 and according the status of forces agreement, all the troops—even the residual force will be pulled out of Iraq.”

²² Ibid., (accessed).

²³ Ibid., (accessed).

²⁴ "U.S. To Be 'More Aggressive' with Iraq on Political Reform."

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ "Obama's Envoy Pick: Iran Is Real Problem for Iraq," *AFP*, 03/25/ 2009.

Political reform to promote a sustainable and self-reinforcing progress in Iraq is the foundation of the Obama administration's new strategy for victory in Iraq. The strategy, as announced by the Obama administration states:

This strategy is grounded in a clear and achievable goal shared by the Iraqi people and the American people: an *Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant* ... To achieve that goal, we will work to promote an Iraqi government that is just, representative, and accountable, ... a strong political, diplomatic, and civilian effort on our part can advance progress and help lay a *foundation for lasting peace and security* ... *We can serve as an honest broker in pursuit of fair and durable agreements on issues that have divided Iraq's leaders.* And just as we will support Iraq's Security Forces, we will *help Iraqi institutions strengthen their capacity to protect the rule of law, confront corruption, and deliver basic services*²⁸

Basically, this study argues that achieving the original goal of OIF and the outcome intended by the military surge, and fulfilling the goals of the Obama administration's strategy in Iraq will require "reforming the decision making process"²⁹ in Iraq through reforming the "formal electoral rules"³⁰ and mechanisms.³¹ This course of action is imperative

²⁸ "Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq (Camp Lejeune, North Carolina)", (accessed).

²⁹ Deborah Stone, *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*, Revised Edition ed. (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2002). 355.

³⁰ Pippa Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior* (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 7 "formal electoral rules are understood here as the legislative framework governing elections, as embodied in official documents, constitutional conventions, legal statutes, codes of conduct, and administrative procedures, authorized by law and enforceable by courts." Also see: Stone. 287 "rules create rather surprising incentives to assume particular identities." And: Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton University Press, 2004). 1 & 104.

³¹ Stone. 354 & 367 "Mechanic the metaphor suggests taking our policy problems to a mechanic rather than fighting them out in a political contest. By focusing on ends

since “electoral systems are commonly regarded as some of the most basic democratic structures, from which much else follows.”³²

Therefore, in Chapter One, this study will demonstrate that the essence of the problem in Iraq lies in the nature and actions of the Iraqi elites.³³ Chapter Two, analyzes the current political structure and electoral system in Iraq, demonstrating how the political and electoral system in Iraq institutionalizes the actions of these elites and facilitates the enhancement of factional identities.

The reform advocated in this study is inspired by the American experience during the revision of the Articles of Confederation and the Constitutional Convention. Consequently, Chapter Three explores the American experience during this specific, constitution-building era and draws parallels between the current situation in Iraq and the challenges the US faced after its Declaration of Independence, incorporating lessons from the American experience and demonstrating how those lessons inform the strategy advocated here.

(better for what?) rather than distribution (better for whom) this approach conceals questions of power. Problems of authority are converted into a matter of technical requirement.”

³² Norris. 3.

³³ III and others. 15 “The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and key players within the government too often act in their sectarian interest. Iraq’s Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders frequently fail to demonstrate the political will to act in Iraq’s national interest, and too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern effectively. The result is an even weaker central government than the constitution provides.” & 20 “too many political leaders still pursue their personal, sectarian, or party interests.”

Chapter Four, building on previous discussion, advocates a substitute electoral system for Iraq that will provide remedies to the problems stated in Chapter Two. It is strongly informed by the statement:

Electoral reform is founded upon the principle that altering the formal rules matters based on the assumption that certain desirable consequences for certain social and political engineering can be achieved.³⁴

Hence, the proposed reformation aims at reshaping the “form and membership of the decision-making body,”³⁵ by changing “who makes the decision” to reshape the outcome in Iraq.³⁶ This study concludes that even though the advocated system entails difficulties; nevertheless, it will provide the most efficacious overall approach—given the context of Iraqi specificities—to the range of problems facing Iraq.

It is important to remember that without solid and steady political progress in Iraq, America will win every battle and gain victories on the tactical and operational levels, but will never win the war and achieve its strategic objective. Therefore, this study proposes a system that will forge consensus among the Iraqi people rather than the political elites. Furthermore, the institutional reforms advocated in this study will, as is demonstrated, produce a lasting mechanism that will channel the Iraqi efforts to compete through democratic institutions, under the conviction

³⁴ Norris. 5.

³⁵ Stone. 356.

³⁶ Ibid. 355.

that the attempts to establish democracy will only be “consolidated when most conflicts are processed through democratic institutions.”³⁷

³⁷ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 51.

Chapter I:

The Essence of the Problem in Iraq And Means To Mitigate It

Shifting the focus from military and security to political issues, is indeed the right path. Violence in Iraq is typically characterized as being either against an occupying force, or factional (sectarian and ethnic). While the elements of such motivations are present, and indeed are responsible for some problems, nevertheless, this assumption remains largely erroneous.³⁸ Sectarian and ethnic strife is not the primary cause of violence,³⁹ nor is the presence of foreign troops. The main driver of violence in Iraq is the struggle for power⁴⁰ and competition for resources by political elites.⁴¹

³⁸ "Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000). 855 "observers may be concluding too quickly that popular involvement in "ethnic violence" and support for extremist leaders is motivated in a straightforward fashion by underlying ethnic animosities and fears" and: Woodward. 244 General George Casey's statement "the current conflict in Iraq is as much about division of political and economic power as it is sectarian violence."

³⁹ Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996). 20, 21, 22, 30, & 35.

⁴⁰ Paul Risley and Timothy D. Sisk, *Policy Options on Democratic Reform, Democracy and United Nations Peace-Building at the Local Level: Lessons Learned* (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2005). 8 "At the centre of virtually every conflict is the State and its power—who controls it and how it is used. No conflict can be resolved without answering those questions, and nowadays the answers almost always have to be democratic ones, at least in form.... Democracy is practiced in many ways, and none of them is perfect. But at its best it provides a means for managing and resolving disputes peacefully, in an atmosphere of mutual trust" and: Timothy D. Sisk, *Pathway of the Political: Electoral Processes after Civil War, Discussion Draft for Research Partnership on Postwar State-Building*. (Denver: University of Denver, 2006). And: Sisk; Sameer N. Yacoub, "Iraqi Prime Minister Lectures against Sectarianism," *AP*, 01/25/ 2009. Prime Minister Maliki's statement "The constitution has not called for the division of the country, but the people who have the ambition to create their own mini-state here and there were behind such practices," and:

Elections and their aftermath promise to be contentious and potentially bloody as Iraq's three main ethnic and religious groups—the ... Kurds and Sunni Arabs and the ... Shia Arabs—vie for power. More troubling still, factions within each of these ethnic and sectarian groups will contend for power in the regions they dominate—using local patronage and control of Iraq's resources, revenues, and guns, as well as appeals based on longstanding religious traditions in Iraq⁴²

In his book, Paul Bremer's description of several encounters with the Iraqi Governing Council (GC) members—who were trying to secure “a piece of the pie,”⁴³ the pie being Iraq⁴⁴—nicely proves this point.⁴⁵

Mohammad Akef Jamal, "Victim of Quota System", Gulf News <http://www.gulfnews.com/opinion/columns/region/10275537.html> (accessed 02/25/2009). And: Woodward. 186, 187, 189, 242 The opinion of General George Casey the MNFI commander in Iraq: “there is a struggle for division of power between Iraqis.” And: Duss and Juul. 1 “On January 31, 2009, Iraqis will vote in the country's first provincial elections in four years. These elections will deliver a preliminary verdict on the vigorous and often violent competition between Iraq's contending political factions, and help shape the contours of Iraq's future.” And: Sodaro. 264. And: Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, "Six Years after Saddam Hussein, Nouri Al-Maliki Tightens His Grip on Iraq," *The Guardian*, 04/30/ 2009. Three officers from the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INSI) stated that: “It's not about sects any more its about the party, the interest of the party.”

⁴¹ *Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, General David H. Petraeus Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq*. “The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources.” And: Cynthia J. Arnson and L. William Zartman, *Rethinking the Economics of War, the Intersection of Need, Cree, and, Greed* (Washington The Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, 2005). 3 “David Keen ‘war is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection.’” And: III and others. 19 “The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in support of national reconciliation.”

⁴² Duss and Juul. 1 & 2. Also see: Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 39. And: Sam Dagher, "Iraqi Report on Corruption Cites Prosecutors' Barriers," *The New York Times*, 05/05/ 2009. And: Steven Lee Myers, "Iraqi Forces: Rebuilt and Stronger, but Still Stumbling," *The New York Times*, 05/07/ 2009.

⁴³ L. Paul Bremer III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 148 & 149.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 296, & 303.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* Presented with an understanding of the risk of over-generalizing, and acknowledging that there were competent figures in the GC, or members of the GC

Violence in Iraq is elite led.⁴⁶ Sectarian and ethnic banners are mainly means for these elites to mobilize support and maintain their struggle for power against their adversaries.⁴⁷ These elites also indoctrinate people and manipulate their insecurities, for their—the political elites’—own gains and purposes.⁴⁸

political parties that rose to the level of responsibility after the handover of sovereignty. These competent figures are exceptions to the description of the elites that this paper portrays. The intention here is to address the group characteristic, and the outcome of including this group. Keeping in mind whilst reading this study, that all the senior positions—President, Vice Presidents, Prime Ministers, dominant political figures inside and outside parliament—up until today are either occupied by members of the Governing Council convened by Paul Bremer, or are senior members of the parties that formed the GC; the following encounters reflects the point this thesis is making that the elites are responsible for the mischief in Iraq: 123 “The Governing Council’s effectiveness was hampered, from the first day to the last, by lax work habits. They established a pattern of meeting Monday through Thursday, usually just in the morning, but even then not starting until after 10:00 A.M. After treating themselves to a lavish luncheon, members would drift off to other activities or a long siesta in the baking after noon ... the Governing Council worked fewer hours in a week than the CPA worked every day.” & 124 “the one issue on which the GC did work quickly was paying itself ... they came up with an outrageous budget for the Council ... they were to have gasoline allowance which ... will allow each member to drive fifty thousand miles a month ... the budget that they proposed for the twenty-five member GC was more than that of the Education Ministry, which had more than 325,000 employees.” & 189 “It was clear that we were reaching a crisis point on the Governing Council’s ineffectiveness ... the twenty four members, still split along sectarian and ethnic lines.” & 195 Bremer called them the “committee of the Black Hole,’ since nothing ever emerged from the Council.”

⁴⁶ Jim Hoagland, "Iraq's Good Example," *The Washington Post*, 02/08/ 2009.

⁴⁷ "Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." 853. And: James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review* 78 (September 1984). 744 “symbolic behavior is also a strategic element in political competition. Individuals and groups are frequently hypocritical, reciting sacred myths without believing them and while violating their implications. In particular, a serious theoretical understanding of myths, symbols, and rituals must include some attention to the dynamics of symbols, to the processes by which symbols shape the behavior not only of the innocent but of the society as a whole.” And: Yacoub.

⁴⁸ Stone. 323 “indoctrination is defined as the intentional manipulation of opinions and preferences and the destruction or prevention of independent judgment ... it happens in the everyday relation between citizens and between citizens and the states” & 315 “relationship in which dominant elites control peoples beliefs and knowledge in a manipulative and self-interested way. Then it is possible to see how indoctrination can

The “ongoing”⁴⁹ intra-sect confrontations between rival but like-minded religious Shiite factions for supremacy,⁵⁰ and similar confrontations between rival Sunni parties for power,⁵¹ are clear indicators that the struggle in Iraq is for power. Even the interaction

happen in non-totalitarian societies.” And: Woodward. 245 Iraqi Leaders are advancing Sectarian Agendas.” & 246 Former Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s questioning “if they themselves are undermining population security through sectarianism how in the world are we going to use American forces to do it?” & “the intelligence indicated that the Maliki government still showed signs of backing a sectarian agenda.”

⁴⁹ Duss and Juul. 1 “the ongoing competition among rival Shia factions—manifested in a series of political and military confrontations in the wake of the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein.” 2 “How the points of contention among Iraq’s Shia parties, which mirror the divisions within Iraq’s broader Shia Arab community, are resolved at the ballot box and in the streets of the country by their respective militias.” & 2 “... three dominant and fiercely independent Shia political organizations—the Da’wa Party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, or ISCI, and the Sadrists, along with the smaller but still significant Fadhila—will attempt through the ballot box and armed conflict to secure a majority of Shia votes in Iraq in order to lead the country’s Shia-majority provinces. And: Abdul-Ahad. Three officers from the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INSI) stated that: “Maliki and the leadership of Dawa [Maliki’s party] managed to obtain the loyalty of military and civilian institutions and commanders and now those officers are loyal to Dawa and moved their alliances from other parties.

⁵⁰ “Bloodshed in Iraq, Intra-Shia Violence Amid Other Underlines”, *The Economist* http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10925638 (accessed 11/11/ 2008). And: Philip Zelikow, “The New Strategic Situation in Iraq”, *Foreign Policy* http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/09/the_new_strategic_situation_in_iraq (accessed 02/25/ 2009). “The United Iraqi Alliance bloc is disintegrating (the largest bloc in parliament that is purely Shiite).” And: III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 16 “fissures have emerged within the broad Shiite coalition, known as the United Iraqi Alliance. Shiite factions are struggling for power—over regions, ministries, and Iraq as a whole. The difficulties in holding together a broad and fractious coalition have led several observers in Baghdad to comment that Shiite leaders are held “hostage to extremes.” Within the coalition as a whole, there is a reluctance to reach a political accommodation with the Sunnis or to disarm Shiite militias.” And: III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 148 , 195, 196, 198, 330, 368, & 369. And: Alissa J. Rubin, “Shiite Rivalries Slash at a Once Calm Iraqi City,” *The New York Times*, 06/21/ 2007.

⁵¹ Karen DeYoung, “Experts Doubt Drop in Violence in Iraq, Military Statistics Called into Question,” *The Washington Post*, 09/06/ 2007. And: Zelikow, (accessed). “Sunni parties ... Are fractured.” And: Fadhel Al-Badrani, “Iraq Tribes Threaten to Take up Arms over Poll,” *Reuters*, 02/02/ 2009. And: Mohammed Abbas, “Iraq Sunni Anti-Qaeda Leader Eyes Shi’ite Alliance,” *Reuters*, 04/12/ 2009. “A senior leader in a Sunni Arab movement founded to combat al Qaeda in Iraq is edging away from the military activity of the past, toward a once unthinkable alliance with the country’s Shi’ite prime minister.”

between the Kurdish parties “each vying to outdo the other”⁵² proves the point.⁵³

Consequently, redesigning the electoral process will facilitate shifting the locus of power⁵⁴ and allow Iraqi politics to shift from the power games of the elites—molded as identity-based politics and leading to “descriptive representation”⁵⁵—to “substantive representation.”⁵⁶

Building on the premise that “formal electoral rules are not neutral in their impact; instead, they systematically benefit some while penalizing others,”⁵⁷ “the hope in proposing a structural change is to

⁵² III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 386. Also see: Scott Carpenter and Michael Rubin, “Kurdistan's Troubled Democracy,” *The Washington Post*, 04/18/ 2009. And: “Iraq Kurdish Force 'Beyond Law',” *BBC*, 04/14/ 2009.

⁵³ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 96 “on July 10, 2003 the two Kurdish parties informed us that they had been unable to agree between them on any additional female member,” 124 “the Two Kurdish leaders ... had been unable to agree which of them should take the Kurdish seat. So they demanded that each of them be seated in the Councils Presidency,” 149 “the Kurds divvied up their five cabinet positions between the two main Kurdish parties.” Furthermore, The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), fought bitterly over the control of the Kurdish region after gaining *de facto* autonomy following Iraq’s defeat in the first Gulf War. And, they continued to run completely separate and disconnected areas of influence in the northern Kurdish region, with two governments and territories, until after 2003. This occurred despite the fact that both are Kurdish nationalist parties, and Sunni Muslims. Also see: “Amnesty International Warns of Rights Abuses in Iraqi Kurdistan,” *Washington TV*, 04/14/ 2009.

⁵⁴ March and Olsen. 744 “internal institutional processes affect things like the power distribution, the distribution of preferences, or the management of control.”

⁵⁵ Stone. 359 “representatives who share important demographic characteristics with their constituents.”

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 359 “representatives who share important policy beliefs and goals with their constituents.”

⁵⁷ Norris. 9. Also see: Donald L. Horowitz, “Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers,” *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 4 (October 2003). 116 “The fact that each electoral system contains a different array of biases from every other electoral system

split up old or potential alliances, establish new ones, and so place a favored interest in a position of dominance.”⁵⁸ Finally, this study’s recommendations are devised in such a way to filter the Iraqi elites and promote moderates.⁵⁹

Moderates share the perspective of a free democratic Iraq; therefore, shifting power in their favor will make attaining the strategic objectives stated above, feasible, and enduring.⁶⁰ Note that such a proposal is closely aligned with the objective of the military surge to “buy time ... so that a moderate coalition can emerge.”⁶¹

The United States can play a crucial role in advancing such a structural change. The US remains an important stake holder in Iraq.⁶² Most of the key actors in Iraq are still vulnerable vis-à-vis each other.⁶³

means that those who decide among such systems can choose, in effect, to prefer one set of biases over another.”

⁵⁸ Stone. 375.

⁵⁹ Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997). 58 “designing electoral arrangements that reward moderation rather than extremism” and: Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies* 44 (1996). 939 “what do institutions do? ... they provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action ... provide filters for interpretation ... institutions affect the very identities, self-image, and preferences of actors.” & 941 “institutions distribute power unevenly across social groups or interests.”

⁶⁰ "Iraqi P.M. Calls for Strong Central Government," *AFP*, 01/29/ 2009.

⁶¹ Woodward. 275.

⁶² Zelikow, (accessed). “The U.S. military presence remains a large, vital, reality in Iraq.”

⁶³ Ibid. (accessed). “there are growing dangers of civil conflict in northern Iraq ... the United States could find itself caught in the middle between Kurdish friends, local

This alignment will allow the US to play a pivotal role—possibly even serve as a “trigger”⁶⁴—to induce this change, if it is to adopt such a structural re-modification as an essential part of its “political surge.”⁶⁵ The US can exert external pressures, provide inducements to alter the political calculus, and promote the advocated change.⁶⁶

The US intervention in this matter will help tilt the balance and mitigate the extreme asymmetries of power among those who genuinely share America’s vision of the new Iraq, and extremists in power.⁶⁷ These extremists benefit from the current formula; moderates, on the other hand, are left much too weak. Thus, they cannot possibly induce a change.⁶⁸ Therefore, external interference is crucial for such an institutional change. If and when such a change materializes, Iraq will then be on the right path, as this study will show.⁶⁹

Sunni nationalists, and a central government in Baghdad that might be tempted to win Sunni friends by "dealing" forcefully with the Kurds. The Kurds might be a tempting scapegoat for a government that wants to highlight itself as an Arab national unifier ... And the decline in oil prices will constrain the national government's largess.”

⁶⁴ Pierson. 141.

⁶⁵ Stone. 274 “incentives work by capitalizing on the weaknesses of the targets, not by empowering them.” & 305 persuasion possibly even through inducing fear Also see: "Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq (Camp Lejeune, North Carolina)", (accessed).

⁶⁶ Stone. 266 & 267 and: Hall and Taylor. 939.

⁶⁷ Hall and Taylor. 938.

⁶⁸ Pierson. 143 also see: 142 “institutional resilience.’ Can be accounted as factors to sustain the institutional change.” Also see: Stone. 269 “no fear of attenuation.”

⁶⁹ Hoagland.

Chapter II:

The Political and Electoral System in Post Saddam's Iraq— Flawed And Malfunctioning

The strategic objective of OIF suffered a fatal blow because of the way the political process was operationalized in Iraq. Even before the onset of OIF, the Americans relied on a group of Iraqis in exile⁷⁰ for information on how to shape post-Saddam Iraq.⁷¹ The Iraqi political and electoral systems were devised by the Coalition Provincial Authority, after consultations with the UN.⁷²

The Iraqi political system is parliamentarian. It follows the concept of infusion of powers. The parliament consists of 275 representatives.⁷³ The electoral system established after 2003 is a closed party list⁷⁴

⁷⁰ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 48, 55, 58, 59, 83, 92, 93, Bad advice from Iraqi exiles of whom many showed no reservation to project their biased approach, or even outright dismay with the Concept of Iraq as a country. As such, 27, 38, 54, 59, 81, 93, 94 Paul Bremer came to Iraq with a sectarian mind set. 224 and continued to build on that mind set by taking advice from such sectarian and ethnically biased figures as he states in deriving his conclusions “all my conversation with Kurdish and Shiite Leaders.” And: Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006). 391 “Bremer took bad advice.”

⁷¹ Gordon and Trainor. 582&583 (Subject: Iraq: Political consultations, 19 June, point #4 and 8). And: III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 26.

⁷² Pierson. 104 the CPA and UN “determined the choice of the formal institutions in Iraq.” And: III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 218, see also: 230, 240, 328, 348, 356, & 367.

⁷³ *Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet*, (United Nations Electoral Assistance Division). 5 & 6.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* 6.

proportional representation,⁷⁵ and Iraq as a whole is a single electoral district.⁷⁶ People merely vote for closed and broad coalition lists consisting of 275 candidates to elect representatives to the legislative.⁷⁷ These representatives elect a president and, the President in turn

⁷⁵ Ibid. 5, 7 & 8 “Inclusive: The main purpose for the national assembly in the transition is to form a constituent assembly. The legitimacy of the constitution will depend heavily on broad inclusiveness and representation of interests amongst the national assembly. The PR system is most effective in gaining inclusive representation for a range of groups, rather than a “winner take-all” system (plurality-majority systems), where large groups can secure an overwhelming majority. Simple and transparent: The PR system allows a voter to cast one vote, which simplifies the voting process to include lowering the voter education requirements – and creates a more transparent system. The simplicity of the system also makes it more operationally feasible to implement. No census data required: The system can be implemented on a single national district without census data and a lengthy and controversial exercise to determine sub-national electoral districts. In so doing, it also minimizes difficulties and controversies of population movement within the country (e.g. Kirkuk). Best for women and minorities: The system accommodates the goal for achieving women’s representation and fair representation of minorities, as they will be able to vote collectively from around the country for the same list or candidate. (If the elections were conducted in sub-national districts, their votes would be restricted to localized parties or large national groups with the resources to compete around the country.) Encourages alliances and moderate positions: The system encourages political groups to form alliances around the country and appeal to as many constituencies as possible. Similarly, this need to appeal to differing constituencies tends to moderate a group’s position. At the same time, the PR system also allows independent candidates to be elected, without forcing them to join political parties. Permits local representation: By not requiring national coverage/presence and permitting partial lists (of as few as 12 candidates), as well as independent candidates – the system permits a basis for localized representation to emerge. Least vulnerable to security problems: The national district permits candidates to campaign with less disruption caused by localized violence or insecurity. By being placed on a national ballot, the effectiveness of targeted political violence against candidates is minimized. Similarly, lists of candidates reduce the ability to individually target and intimidate. Most accommodating to out-of-country voting: The system accommodates a practical response to out-of-country voting. A national district permits out-of-country voters to participate in the process, as their vote does not have to be counted towards a sub-national location, which can be highly controversial. The IECEI has decided to pursue a limited (will occur in several countries) out-of-country operation that is estimated to cost about US\$90 million. (The countries in which out-of-country voting may occur have not been determined at this time.)”

⁷⁶ Ibid. 6.

⁷⁷ Norris. 51 in closed lists “voter can only select which party to support, and each party decides the ranking of their candidates on the list. The rank order of candidates on the party list determines who is elected to parliament.”

nominates a Prime Minister from the majority bloc in parliament.⁷⁸ The Prime Minister (PM) must be voted in by the parliament,⁷⁹ and is the chief executive in Iraq.⁸⁰ The PM is also the Commander in Chief of the armed forces.⁸¹

The rationale behind choosing such a system was that proportional representations are easy to design and implement.⁸² The idea was that the designed system is “inclusive” and “represents a broad and diverse cross-section of the Iraqi society.”⁸³ However, these designers left out a consequential question, the inclusion of whom? The consequences of overlooking such a question were and are devastating, as this study will demonstrate.⁸⁴

The previous regime in Iraq was dictatorial and governed through a single party⁸⁵ for three and a half decades.⁸⁶ This diminished the

⁷⁸ *Country Profile: Iraq*, (Washington DC: Federal Research Division, 2006). 16.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 17.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* 16 and: III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 373.

⁸¹ *Country Profile: Iraq*. 16.

⁸² *Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet*. 6.

⁸³ *Ibid.* 5.

⁸⁴ Horowitz. 115 “To evaluate an electoral system or to choose a new one, it is necessary to ask first what one wants the electoral system to do. No electoral system simply reflects voter preferences or the existing pattern of cleavages in a society or the prevailing political party configuration. Every electoral system shapes and reshapes these features of the environment, and each does so in different ways.” Also see for the interactions among electoral rules and elites: Richard Gunther, “Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain,” *The American Political Science Review* 83, no. 3 (1989). 835 & 853.

prospects for the emergence of civil society. Hundreds of thousands if not millions of Iraqi citizens were victims of massacres. Iraqis lived under the oppression and tyranny of a handful of loyalists faithful to Saddam under a single party system.⁸⁷ This took a very heavy toll on the Iraqi social fabric;⁸⁸ emotions were high, and wounds were fresh. Saddam Hussein, the head of this tyrannical regime governed with an iron fist. This eliminated the chances for political parties to form and evolve. There were no organized political parties, with the exception of a few mainly extremist parties “offering nondemocratic ideologies ... representing ethnic or religious positions ... and, parties based on a proposal to break up the existing nation-state.”⁸⁹ These parties were formed and vetted in other countries in the region, and lived in exile.⁹⁰

Iraq as a nation was dismantled after the fall of Baghdad. The government collapsed, and there was no replacement; the Iraqi Security

⁸⁵ Jennifer Gandhi, *Political Institutions under Dictatorship* (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 152.

⁸⁶ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 30 & 79.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* 35.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* 379.

⁸⁹ Jr. G. Bingham Powell, "Party Systems and Political System Performance: Voting Participation, Government Stability and Mass Violence in Contemporary Democracies," *The American Political Science Review* 75, no. 4 (1981). P862& P865

⁹⁰ Gordon and Trainor. 470.

Forces were dissolved, and the infrastructure and institutions were looted and burned.⁹¹ This dismantlement left a vacuum.⁹²

Consequently, after the fall of Saddam's regime and transition from dictatorship, the institutional gap was filled by the previously mentioned extremist parties that had been in exile.⁹³ The majority of these parties are formed around ethnic and sectarian lines; they held ideologies that negated all that the American objective stood for and had regional ties that ran against the US's vision for the future of Iraq and the region.⁹⁴

The designed political system in Iraq yielded unanticipated consequences.⁹⁵ The political and electoral systems employed in Iraq alienated the constituency,⁹⁶ empowered radical and extremist political parties and elites, and excluded moderates.⁹⁷

⁹¹ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 37.

⁹² *Ibid.* 27, & 31.

⁹³ Sisk. 5 "Civil society is weak and populations are traumatized by the effects of war: weak civil society and affected populations are less able to stand up to political forces led by extremists or ideologues" and: III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 49.

⁹⁴ Gordon and Trainor. 470.

⁹⁵ Pierson. 104.

⁹⁶ Stone. 298 "in proportional representation a legislator's electoral fortune depends far more on that of his own political party and less on pleasing voters with tangible and symbolic rewards."

⁹⁷ Ayad Allawi, "How Iraq's Elections Set Back Democracy," *The New York Times*, 11/02/ 2007. "gave rise to our sectarian Parliament, controlled by party leaders rather

Basically, the implemented system has totally backfired. To illustrate the connection between the structure of the devised political system in Iraq and the unraveling of events, the following paragraph reveals similar results of employing the same kind of system in another country. For in fact, the emplaced system in Iraq is a replica of the electoral system in Israel, and has yielded an exacerbated form of the complications from which Israel is suffering:⁹⁸

The choice and composition of the government were practically out of the hands of the voters.

Popular disaffection with the established parties rose, and the overall perception of democracy was being tarnished.

Electoral deadlock was no longer an exception, but the norm.

New and splinter parties were encouraged to form, thereby constantly increasing the fragmentation and polarization of the party system ...

Multiparty governments made the process of decision making difficult, with veto power granted to most parties in the coalition on a variety of issues.

Cabinet crises occurred frequently, immobilizing the government for long periods of time.

The overall result was not only a non-working parliamentary format, but a dangerous crisis of democratic authority.⁹⁹

than by the genuine representatives of the people. They have assembled a government unaccountable and unanswerable to its people.”

⁹⁸ Reuven Y. Hazan, "Presidential Parliamentarism Direct Popular Election of the Prime Minister, Israel's New Electoral and Political System," *Electoral Studies* 15, no. 1 (1996), 23 "The Israeli polity entered a crisis period ... during which the two major parties tried to outbid each other with ever-increasing offers in order to 'purchase' the political support of the religious parties."

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* 27.

Similar repercussions in Iraq from instituting the same, of the political system of Israel, are due to the failure to measure how the designed political and electoral system relates to the following attributes of the Iraqi context:¹⁰⁰

First, proportional systems require unity,¹⁰¹ a requirement that the political parties in Iraq can not satisfy. If this requirement is absent, then proportional systems: (a) will produce coalition governments that are fragmented, weak, and, unstable;¹⁰² and (b) will enable extremist parties to gain power, and produce legislative fractionalization.¹⁰³ As such, proportional representation has “reinforced, rather than ameliorated ... cleavages.”¹⁰⁴

At best, proportional systems in post-war state-building hinder democratic development and progress,¹⁰⁵ and, may “stimulate a loss of

¹⁰⁰ Allawi.

¹⁰¹ Andre Blais, "The Debate over Electoral Systems," *International Political Science Review* 12, no. 3 (1991). 243. Also: to further clarify what this study means by unity: proportional representation without the presence of an *honored* pact among the elites, or lack of “adjustment,” or the lack of common vision on basic yet characteristically defining issues, would lead to disunity. For definition of pact see: Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press: The Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, 1986). 37.

¹⁰² *Ibid.* 242.

¹⁰³ G. Bingham Powell. 874.

¹⁰⁴ Norris. 65.

¹⁰⁵ Sisk. 20.

confidence in representative democracy.”¹⁰⁶ In the worst case scenario, this system is a threat to the democratic regime,¹⁰⁷ will diminish the prospects of democracy to survive,¹⁰⁸ and will lead to a “breakdown of democracy.”¹⁰⁹

“The median country has about 9 percent of the vote going to extremist parties in the average election ... 15 percent as a mark of extremist support of a serious nature, a figure that seems roughly to correspond to the point at which observers of the country begin to express concern.”¹¹⁰ In Iraq the level of elected parties that fall within the scope of extremism as defined above are close to 90%.¹¹¹ If 15% extremists should generate serious concern, then, the 90% must set off alarms that necessitate revising the entire system.

Fragmentations within the government are maximized because of the political system in Iraq that promotes extremism and incorporates extremist parties in the government.¹¹² Therefore, instead of settling the

¹⁰⁶ Blais. 242.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 255.

¹⁰⁸ G. Bingham Powell. 861.

¹⁰⁹ Blais. 242.

¹¹⁰ G. Bingham Powell. 865.

¹¹¹ Galbraith. 3 & 89.

¹¹² Yacoub. “Iraq's Prime Minister said sectarianism is a ‘rotten thing’ and ... blamed sectarianism for destroying the country.”

accounts and differences through the electoral process;¹¹³ the diversity of interests and approaches are all brought into the government.¹¹⁴

The end result in Iraq today is a natural outcome of this system.¹¹⁵ “The lethality of conflict in Iraq has reached horrendous proportions for civilians. ... The US promotion of democracy in this country provides space for partisan electoral politics by ethnic and religious groups ... and also, paradoxically, increases risks of terrorism.”¹¹⁶

Second, the implemented system totally alienated the Iraqi people,¹¹⁷ since the closed party list version of the proportional system gives the elites the ability to determine who gets elected in Iraq.¹¹⁸ The voter merely votes for coalition lists, and does not have a say in choosing candidates.¹¹⁹ So, the elites have the upper hand in forming the

¹¹³ Blais. 244.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. 242 & 244.

¹¹⁵ Hall and Taylor. 937 & 938 the structure of institutions molds politics. And: Pierson. 165 “North’s definition of institutions ‘the rules of the game in a society or ... the humanly devised constrains that shape human interaction.’”

¹¹⁶ J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict* (Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2008). 9.

¹¹⁷ Blais. 242 “voters exercise less control over the government. It is more difficult to get rid of a coalition than of a one-party government.”

¹¹⁸ Sisk. 9 “closed-list nature of the system gives political parties strong internal power over their own rank-and-file (through the control of candidacy selection) such that the top-level elites normally wield considerable power; closed-list PR systems are power-centralizing.” And: Norris. 51.

¹¹⁹ Pippa Norris, “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems,” *International Political Science Review* 18, no. 3 (1997). 303 “voters can only

legislative branch, not the people. Based on the principle of infusion of powers, those who control who get voted into parliament, also control the formation of the executive branch. Over and above, ideally, the PM nominates cabinet members who are approved by parliament.¹²⁰ However, the consensual part of the Iraqi political system—the concept of “National Unity” Government—gives the respective political entities the authority to nominate cabinet members.

The chief executive must balance the varying interests of the political elites since s/he relies on these elites to gain power. On the other hand, neither the executive nor the legislative branches heed the people’s needs since voters are not the source of their power. The dominant political entities and their party elites are the source of power in Iraq. Therefore, only these elites’ interests and agendas are considered.

The political process in Iraq became a hostage in the hands of elites. The entire process lacks transparency and accountability—an important component of any democratic system.¹²¹ Moreover, the system is not flexible and is not prone to change. The elites tightly control the

select the party, and the ranking of candidates is determined by the political party. The rank order on the party list determines which candidates are elected.”

¹²⁰ *Country Profile: Iraq*. 17.

¹²¹ Stone. 360 “the central test of representation is not whether representatives share demographic characteristics with constituents but whether they are accountable to their constituents.”

system,¹²² and the system does not allow for elite alterations.¹²³ “The outcome of each election is a foregone conclusion, leaving only the exact allocation of parliamentary seats to be decided.”¹²⁴

As such, a fundamental tenet of democracy—power vested in the citizens—is missing in Iraq;¹²⁵ citizens are marginalized or totally excluded from the process. Thus, people in Iraq living under miserable circumstances do not have an outlet for their grievances.¹²⁶ This naturally produces tensions and promotes violence.

“Many Iraqis feel that crime not only is unpunished, it is rewarded;”¹²⁷ “Pessimism is pervasive;”¹²⁸ and this negative atmosphere

¹²² Allawi. “gave rise to our sectarian Parliament, controlled by party leaders rather than by the genuine representatives of the people. They have assembled a government unaccountable and unanswerable to its people.” and: Pierson. 145 contrary to Pierson’s assertion that political actors do not have property rights, parties unlike people have very long durability.

¹²³ Sisk. 20.

¹²⁴ Hazan.

¹²⁵ Charles Tilly, *Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 10 “‘polyarchal democracy’ installs six distinctive institutions: elected officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship ... criteria for polyarchal democracy describe a working process, a series of regularized interactions among citizens and officials. These go far beyond the usual procedural standards ... if a regime operates all six institutions, it counts as a democracy. If it lacks any of them, or some of them aren’t really working, it doesn’t count as a democracy,” 11 & 12 “full-fledged citizenship, which plays a crucial part in democracy.”

¹²⁶ Stone. 360 “citizens who have no influence over ‘their’ representatives and no way to kick them out of office if they do not effectively represent the citizens’ policy views.” & 336 an unrighteous system since “to bring grievances is absolutely essential to the function of a rights system.”

¹²⁷ III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 8.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* 9.

hampers the rule of law, thus forcing Iraqis to join one side or another out of no choice but to survive.

What makes the situation in Iraq even worse is the nature of the empowered elites in Iraq.¹²⁹ Noting that the role of elites and the distribution of capabilities among these elites determine the course—success or failure—of transitions from dictatorship:

The centrality of political elites in establishing and terminating democracy, and deficits in rule of law and state capacity as the primary challenge to the quality and survival of new democracies ... ranging from ... the origins and design of democracy to its overall quality and sustainability ... There is also widespread agreement that political elites play a central role in democratization ... In particular, whether there is a transition from dictatorship to democracy seems to depend heavily on the interests, values, and actions of political leaders ... If political leaders, for various reasons, are understood to be the founders of democracy, then they also often function, after that initial breakthrough, as its sustainers or its underminers ... Political elites design political institutions (which affect the quality and, perhaps, the very survival of democracy).¹³⁰

The key question for regime paths is the distribution of liberal and illiberal political groupings between these two categories and the resources that mobilized versus demobilized groups command.¹³¹

¹²⁹ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 83, 85, 86, 87, 100, 122, & 123 “the rotating presidency also hindered the GC’s effectiveness. It had seemed a necessary compromise when the Council was formed in July. Members found that they could not agree on any one leader and instead, through a tortuous line of reasoning – emblematic of the sectarian divides within the body, and Iraq itself—wound up selecting a nine-man rotating presidency.”

¹³⁰ Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations," *Comparative Political Studies* (2000);. 703, 707, & 709.

¹³¹ *Ibid.* 713.

The extremist parties that have risen to power in Iraq have a dually devastating effect. These parties and their elites are identity oriented.¹³² They capitalize on their sectarian and/or ethnic affiliations in a top down manner to maintain their power.¹³³ As such, the elites in Iraq use all the resources available—their financial resources, militias,¹³⁴ the educational

¹³² Suzanne Mettler and Joe Soss, "The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics," *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 1 (Mar., 2004). 59 "Institutions that cultivate values and beliefs; the vitality and alignment of organizations that transform diffuse groups into coherent political collectives-e.g., parties, unions; political actors' targeted mobilization and demobilization efforts; political opportunity structures related to elite cleavages, propensity for repression, et cetera; and state actions that distribute resources to political groups." And: III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 49 "this ethnically, spiritually, and politically disparate group was not accustomed to cooperation."

¹³³ Sisk. 5 "Post-war environments may be vulnerable to the emergence of wily elites who will mobilize on divisive nationalist, ethnic, or racial themes in their quest for power." And: III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 218 "Sunni Baathists fighting Shiite, and Kurdish Militias, and Iraq fragmenting along sectarian and geographical fault lines." Also see for the role of the elites in transition and consolidation of democracy: Leonardo Morlino and José Ramón Montero, "Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe," in *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation. Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Richard P. Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). 258. And: Mariano Torcal, "The Origins of Democratic Support in Post-Franco: Spain: Learning to Be a Democrat under Authoritarian Rule?," in *Spain Transformed. The Late Franco Dictatorship*, ed. Nigel Towson (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 198 "democratic support and non-democratic regime rejection mostly reflects an attitudinal change springing from the essentially individual political experience of the transition to, and consolidation of, the new democracy; a change in which the most important political and social actors and elites play a leading role. The absence, or failure, of an attempt to politicize the issue of the approval of the preceding regime and/or the new one by significant political actors is the main explanation for the existence of this attitudinal change." Also see: Gandhi. And: Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press: The Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, 1986). And: Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 163 "Elites (politicians, intellectuals, business and associational leaders, media practitioners, and so on) typically have distinctive values and norms (and invariably, more information about the system), and they often lead the way in large-scale value change."

¹³⁴ Anthony J. Schwarz, *Iraq's Militias: The True Threat to Coalition Success in Iraq* (Carlisle: US Army War College, 2007). 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 66 "The militias were also used to coerce and threaten potential voters. For an example of a militia

system, their position in a government that they tightly control—to promote their identity-based approach.¹³⁵ Hence, the elites in Iraq “have blocked, derailed, or corrupted the electoral process in attempts to retain

commander using muscle to advance his political agenda one need look no further than the nomination of Ibrahim Jafari as Prime Minister of Iraq in February 2006. Jafari served as Prime Minister of the Iraqi Transitional Government during the year prior to February’s nomination. The fact that he was broadly ineffective in advancing government programs and promoting national growth did not stop him from gaining the initial 2006 nomination. Jafari had the support of Sadr, whose militia threatened to harm many voting members if Jafari was not nominated in 2006 ... Militias in Iraq and Afghanistan have undermined the political process repeatedly. Although some Iraqi militias and their affiliated political parties support a broad based disarmament initiative in principle, they are reluctant to proceed because of political rivalries, insurgent attacks, ethnic or sectarian violence, and lack of faith in the ability of national security forces. ... militias do not support state institutions. Loyalties lie within the militia organization only. Even worse, militia members often pervade state security mechanisms in order to further the militia’s agenda. Rather than providing security for a national populace, they have little regard for non-militia members. Militias influence the Iraqi security forces at all levels, making legitimate national security force units unable or unwilling to confront them ... When they infiltrate government security forces, as they have in Afghanistan and as has been alleged in Iraq (including the reported Shia militia death squads comprised of forces within the Iraqi government’s Ministry of Interior), militia activity is even more detrimental to security ... Certain Iraqi leaders continue to see the need to utilize militias as an interim solution to quell violence until national security forces are able to provide decisive security. Some experts believe that Iraq’s national party leaders do not have strong beliefs in the long-term political process, and for this reason, will not push to disband groups they view as effective at filling immediate security voids. ... This original CPA attempt at outlawing militias lacked political will on the part of Iraqi lawmakers ... After the Iraqis assumed full control of government, a primary security ministry, the Ministry of Interior, was allowed to fall into the hands of the Badr Corps. Though this private army has since renounced its militia title and now operates under the auspices of a civic group called the Badr Organization, common perception was that Bayan Jabr, former Badr Corps leader and Minister of Interior in 2005, was allowing Badr Corps ideology—if not its leaders directly—to play a strong role in directing the actions of Iraqi police. Many Shia militia members have been allowed to place members into army and police units as a way to serve political interests and gain influence for associated lawmakers. This phenomenon is especially evident in the Shia dominated south, where militia members have hindered the implementation of objective law enforcement. Political will is the single most important aspect of a successful DDR plan targeting militias. ... Without a strong and clear message from the national government, militia activity will continue ... The fact that many militias in Iraq possess political power is significant.” And: Biddle, O’Hanlon, and Pollack. 39.

¹³⁵ Mettler and Soss. 58 ““group-centrism” in mass opinion does not flow directly from some underlying element of individual or group psychology. Rather, it “depends importantly on the political context The *framing* of issues-by partisan elites and mass media organizations shapes public understanding of the roots of contemporary problems and merits of alternative solutions.”

power,”¹³⁶ and, prevent elite alteration. The result is constant injection of sectarianism and ethnocentrism in the Iraqi society.¹³⁷

These elites are not only mistrustful of each other and do not compete for power within the democratic system, they also maintain active military wings that are responsible for much of the violence in Iraq,¹³⁸ directly or indirectly.¹³⁹ The maintenance of military wings and the contestation over power within the realms of government is affecting Iraq’s statehood.¹⁴⁰ This must be understood before even addressing the issue of democracy.¹⁴¹ The interactions of these elites and the resulting power politics deny the Iraqi state a monopoly over coercive means, and also deny recognition that the state is the supreme authority and arbitrator.¹⁴² The process also precludes unity of action in the conduct of

¹³⁶ Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. 4.

¹³⁷ "Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." 857 “considerable evidence suggesting that political elites use violence to construct antagonistic ethnic identities, which in turn favor more violence.” And Stone.: 307 indoctrination through religious propaganda “designed to make its audience or subject serve someone else’s interests ... and rob people’s capacity to think independently ... it relies on appeals to fear, insecurity, or anxiety, it drives out rational thought.” And: Mettler and Soss. 61 “policies convey messages about membership to individual citizens, they also influence patterns of group identity.”

¹³⁸ Woodward. 215, 216, and: III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 274, 275. And: "Executions Main Cause of Civilian Death During Iraq War," *Associated Press* 04/16/ 2009. And: "Iraq Kurdish Force 'Beyond Law'."

¹³⁹ Galbraith. 2 & 6.

¹⁴⁰ Max Fuller, "State-Sanctioned Paramilitary Terror in Basra under British Occupation", Center For Research on Globalization <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9766> (accessed 04/02/ 2009). And: "Iraq Kurdish Force 'Beyond Law'."

¹⁴¹ Linz and Stepan. 7, 17, 18, & 28.

foreign affairs,¹⁴³ since each party lobbies for outside support to gain leverage in its internal struggle. Thus, the actions of these elites are not only jeopardizing the prospects of democracy in Iraq, but are also endangering the Iraqi state itself.

Moreover, such a fierce power dispute has made it virtually impossible to take vital steps necessary to stabilize Iraq—i.e., national reconciliation projects, demobilization, disintegration and reintegration (DDR), and, the rule of law—without constant external pressure from coalition countries.¹⁴⁴ The political system in Iraq has become like entrenched warfare.

Third, reducing Iraq to a single electoral district¹⁴⁵ further facilitated the formation of the Iraqi political arena along sectarian and

¹⁴² Tilly. 11 “the features of states as “organizations that control the major concentration of coercive means within a substantial territory, exercises priority in some regards *over* all other organizations operating within the same territory, and receive acknowledgment of that priority from other organizations, including states, outside the territory.”

¹⁴³ Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics," in *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, ed. Michael Doyle and John Ikenberry. These elites have also hampered Iraq’s ability to conduct foreign affairs as a state. These elites compete for support outside of Iraq also, while states are expected to “posses the capacity of unity of action. This means that states have the capacity to act in coherent manner with regard to other countries. Cohesive in turn means that central decision making maintain sufficient control over different organizational elements of their governments to allow them direct and coordinate government actions in such a way as to implement the decision making strategies, and to do so in a way that reflects their rank-ordering their goals. Thus endowed with the capacity for coherent action in support of a centrally established and consistent hierarchy of goals.”

¹⁴⁴ Allawi. And: Gordon and Trainor. 476.

¹⁴⁵ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 367.

ethnic lines.¹⁴⁶ In Iraq, Kurds are concentrated in the north, Sunnis in the center and western parts of the country, and, Shiite in the south. Therefore, without having to compete in small districts—hence, against entities of the same sect and ethnicity—extremist parties were able to form political coalitions that are homogenous.¹⁴⁷ This facilitates and rewards political entities for capitalizing on identities as credentials to win elections, and has so far punished those who refuse to invoke such credentials as means to win elections. The result is that the three major blocs that account for the vast majority of votes, are characterized as Shiite, Sunni, and, Kurd.¹⁴⁸ This situation was further exacerbated when the Iraqi state was dissolved, and people naturally returned to their sub-identities, for protection.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ Mettler and Soss. 58 “we must look beyond the individual to the communication flows citizens receive from political elites and mass media ... common patterns of political thinking in mass publics can be viewed as politically constructed outcomes ... In this view, partisan loyalties are more than socialized identities or instrumental allegiances; they are also, as Martin Shefter argues, political achievements constructed by innovative organizations that actively seek to attract mass followings.” And: 60 & 61 “Policies can alter preferences and perceptions of self-interest, shape basic beliefs about the nature of social reality, mobilize or pacify constituencies, and foment rebellion or serve to legitimate existing governmental and distributive arrangements ... In some cases, public policies create, sustain, or deepen group divisions, even though the relevant groups may be defined on the basis of shared physical characteristics, cultural beliefs, or locales of residence. Indeed, policy designs not only can affect the ways a target group is viewed in the society at large; they also can influence how group members perceive and evaluate one another”

¹⁴⁷ Pierson. 114&115 long term institutional effects may be better treated as by-products rather than goals of institutional designers ... unanticipated consequences are of tremendous significance in modern polities.” And: Galbraith. 6.

¹⁴⁸ Allawi. “The vast majority of the electorate based their choices on sectarian and ethnic affiliations, not on genuine political platforms.” And: Galbraith. 3. And: Sodaro. 263.

¹⁴⁹ Galbraith. 8, 9, & 90.

Consequently, as mistrust and competitions characterized the relation among elites, accounts have come to be settled on the streets of Iraq through violence.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, to secure as much public support as possible to be leveraged in this power struggle,¹⁵¹ some entities have rallied people based on their sectarian identities,¹⁵² some based on their ethnic identities,¹⁵³ and, others by promoting struggle against an occupier.¹⁵⁴ This is a direct result of the system that does not force elites and political entities to secure cross-factional support to gain power. Hence, factional violence in Iraq is elite-led, and inflamed in a top-down approach.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ Mettler and Soss. 59 “Likewise, group identification and consciousness do not simply emerge for individuals or social groups; they get organized into or out of the political process. As Adam Przeworski explains, ‘If political parties do not mobilize people qua workers ... then workers are less likely to identify themselves as class members and, eventually, less likely to vote as workers.’”

¹⁵¹ "Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." 583 “Strategic action by elites. What the pre-constructivist literature on ethnic conflict termed ‘elite theories of ethnic violence’ provides promising grounds for a constructivist theory of ethnic violence in this sense... In these arguments, ethnic violence is explained as both a means and a by-product of political elites’ efforts to hold or acquire power. Elites foment ethnic violence to build political support; this process has the effect of constructing more antagonistic identities, which favors more violence.”

¹⁵² Ibid. 583.

¹⁵³ Ibid. 583.

¹⁵⁴ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 287 Sherif Hussien Bin Ali’s comment regarding the Sunni insurgency “They do not oppose the coalition or the Americans, But they feel left out.”

¹⁵⁵ "Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." 583 “the content and boundary rules of ethnic categories might be constructed by the actions of individuals seeking various ends. Consider, for example, the proposition that ethnic violence occurs when political elites construct antagonistic ethnic identities in order to strengthen their hold on power. In this approach, the insights of a “constructivist” approach merge with, or become hard to distinguish from, a rationalist or strategic

Fourth, on the government level, the consensual requirement and proportional representation brought these hardened identity-based elites together to share power and governance in Iraq.¹⁵⁶ Iraq today retains an informal “consociational” political system.¹⁵⁷ This consociationalism in

choice approach.” And: Morlino and Montero. 258 “divisive, opportunistic behavior of party elites, now of greater visibility (if not intrusiveness) in the television age.”

¹⁵⁶ Pierson. 104 unanticipated consequences of the designed system by the CPA and the UN. And: Woodward.

¹⁵⁷ Pippa Norris, *Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* (Harvard University, 2005). 3 & 4 “the thesis is that power-sharing regimes encourage group cooperation (at best), and avoid outright ethnic rebellion (at worst), in plural societies divided into distinct linguistic, religious, nationalistic, and/or cultural communities ... Consociationalism is designed to produce a stable political system due to elite cooperation despite social segmentation ... four characteristics of ‘consociational’ constitutions as an ideal-type: *executive power-sharing* among a ‘grand coalition’ of political leaders drawn from all significant segments of society; a *minority veto* in government decision-making, requiring mutual agreement among all parties in the executive; *proportional representation* of major groups in elected and appointed office; and a high degree of *cultural autonomy* for groups ... *such regimes need is a democratic regime that emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority ...*’ The theory of consociationalism emphasizes the importance of governing incentives which work through a ‘top-down’ two-stage process. First, power-sharing arrangements are thought to mitigate conflict among leadership elites. ‘*Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.*’ These arrangements are designed to maximize the number of ‘stakeholders’ who share an interest in playing by the rules of the game. This process is exemplified by proportional electoral systems with low vote thresholds which usually produce multiparty parliaments, with many minor parties each representing distinct segmented communities. In this context, party leaders have an incentive to bargain and collaborate with other factions in parliament in order to gain office in governing coalitions ... all plural societies containing distinct ethnic communities divided by language, religion, and region, with constitutions characterized by multiple veto-points and extensive power-sharing.” And: Arend Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 2 (April, 2004). 96 & 97 “the constitutional needs of countries with deep ethnic and other cleavages. In such deeply divided societies the interests and demands of communal groups can be accommodated only by the establishment of power sharing ... deep societal divisions pose a grave problem for democracy, and that it is therefore generally more difficult to establish and maintain democratic government in divided than in homogeneous countries ... the successful establishment of democratic government in divided societies requires two key elements: power sharing and group autonomy. Power sharing denotes the participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in political decision making, especially at the executive level; group autonomy means that these groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture. These two characteristics are the primary attributes of

Iraq has hindered democratic consolidation.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, consociationalism in Iraq has created, reinforced, and “frozen group boundaries,”¹⁵⁹ because it shaped institutions and provided incentives for actors competing for power to adopt identity politics. Naturally, the result is political stalemate.¹⁶⁰ Former CIA Director General Michael Hayden stated:

The government is unable to govern ... we have spent a lot of energy and treasure creating a government that is balanced, and it cannot function. The Inability of the government to govern seems irreversible. We have placed all our energies in creating a center, and the center cannot accomplish anything.¹⁶¹

The Coalition Provincial Authority, after consulting the UN¹⁶² and capitalizing on “constitutional experts” detached from the specificities of the Iraqi context,¹⁶³ sought to address the prospects of power struggle in

the kind of democratic system that is often referred to as power-sharing democracy or, to use a technical political-science term, “consociational” democracy.” Also see: Kenneth N. Brown, *Cutting the Gordian Knot: Formation of a Consociational Government for Post Saddam Iraq* (U.S. Army War College). And: Sodaro. 188 & 189

¹⁵⁸ Norris, *Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* 2 “‘Consociationalism’ has always proved controversial.”

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. 2. Furthermore: parties in Iraq applied the principle of consociation to their own “homogenous” coalitions to overcome the zero-sum game that defines the relations among parties—even of those who have the same identity.

¹⁶⁰ Blais. 242 “It is more difficult for the Cabinet to hold together as a unity when the government is a coalition” this is without mentioning that the coalitional is formed by political entities of hardened identities. And: Galbraith. 3. Also see: Hazan. 23 “without a consensus on national priorities, immobilism set in and the government became one of national paralysis.”

¹⁶¹ Woodward. 217, 221 “Hayden had been adamant about the Iraqi government’s inability to govern,” & 222 Lee Hamilton’s remarks.

¹⁶² III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 78, 244, 279, & 281.

Iraq by laying the foundation for national unity government in Iraq through consensus.¹⁶⁴

The designers of the Iraqi political system overlooked the questions: Who will be included by devising such a system? And, National unity and consensus among whom? They introduced a system of sectarian and ethnic quotas in Iraq¹⁶⁵ instead of a national unity government built on consensus. The effects of establishing sectarian and ethnic quotas was that it brought about a gathering mainly of fundamental ethnic and sectarian groups in a so-called representative governing system.¹⁶⁶ This system was emplaced in spite of Bremer's recognition that such a system "can lead to paralysis."¹⁶⁷

This sectarian and ethnic quota system with its consensus focus became the basis upon which the Iraqi political process was built.¹⁶⁸ It is

¹⁶³ Pierson. 112 "constitutional experts' or 'provisions merchants' 'called in to help design systems in lands from homes,' ... 'simply bring along their usual tool kits' ... in short particular arrangements may well be adopted because they are perceived to be appropriate."

¹⁶⁴ Galbraith. 3.

¹⁶⁵ Pierson. 104 unanticipated consequences of the system devised in Iraq. And: Mettler and Soss. 58 "Whoever decides what the game is about decides also who gets into the game." And: Jamal, (accessed). And: III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. Paul Bremer knew that this system could favor extremists 87, 89, 93, 218, 226 "elections ... could favor the best organized political parties, including Islamists," & 242.

¹⁶⁶ Hall and Taylor. 941 "how institutions create paths."

¹⁶⁷ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 213.

¹⁶⁸ *Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet*. And: Pierson. 120 & 121 even if the institutions will outlive the actors, in such a system of heavy reliance on political entities the adverse effects will endure, since, parties unlike people have a much longer life.

imperative to note the importance of timing and the sequencing of events. These factors played “a critical role” since the “early parts of a sequence matter much more than later parts,”¹⁶⁹ and the “final destination depends on the path.”¹⁷⁰ Thus, the head start given to such elites and political entities, and the designed system and sequence of events—along with the speed with which they were rushed in,¹⁷¹—account for many of the problems in Iraq since the regime change.¹⁷²

The consequences are that the UN and the CPA brought in a group of exiles, mainly of rigid religious and ethnic identities,¹⁷³ and provided them with all the resources and power that government can provide to pursue their struggle for power.¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁹ Pierson. 44.

¹⁷⁰ Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. 51.

¹⁷¹ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 225 & 293. And: Sodaro. 267.

¹⁷² Pierson. 13, 18, 19, 31, 39, 44, 45, 55, 56, 60 “tremendous power rests in those who select the sequence design the system gained,” & 71 “initiating a process.”

¹⁷³ March and Olsen. 744 “symbolic behavior is also a strategic element in political competition. Individuals and groups are frequently hypocritical, reciting sacred myths without believing them and while violating their implications. In particular, a serious theoretical understanding of myths, symbols, and rituals must include some attention to the dynamics of symbols, to the processes by which symbols shape the behavior not only of the innocent but of the society as a whole.”

¹⁷⁴ *Conducting a Conflict Assessment - a Framework for Strategy and Program Development*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, 2005). 22 “While certain groups may have an incentive for violence, the question remains as to whether they have the means to do so. Do these groups have the organizational capacity necessary to sustain violence? Do they have access to money and weapons, and on what scale? Do they have international backers? Are there pools of recruits they can draw on? Without these

The above-stated and unanticipated consequences of the system designed by the CPA and the UN created “path dependence,”¹⁷⁵ and “positive feedbacks”¹⁷⁶ for the emerging political elites. In a nutshell, these elites saw their interests being served by such a system. Hence, a loop of “self reinforcing”¹⁷⁷ mechanisms lead these elites to preserve this system that serves well their entrenched interests.¹⁷⁸ Embarking on such an opportunity,¹⁷⁹ these elites and political entities naturally codified their interests, factionalism, and fragmentation, in the constitution¹⁸⁰

resources, no matter how deeply felt a grievance or overwhelming the desire for economic or political gain, incentives for violence cannot find expression. The second major category therefore focuses on whether people with incentives for violence have access to the resources they need to turn that incentive into sustained violence.”

¹⁷⁵ Pierson. 11 “path dependence exemplify ‘historical causation’ in which dynamics triggered by an event or process at one point in time reproduce themselves even in the absence of the recurrence of the original event or process.” & 13 “the significance of the beginning” &18.

¹⁷⁶ Mettler and Soss. 60 “‘policy feedback’ refers to the ways ‘policies, once enacted, restructure subsequent political processes.’ ... two kinds of feedback effects: new policies may transform state capacities by creating, building upon, or undercutting administrative arrangements; and they may affect the identities, political goals, and capabilities of social groups.”

¹⁷⁷ Pierson. 145 &146 “the same set of actors who would lose influence as the result of an institutional reform must agree to any revision one would naturally expect a higher level of institutional resilience.” Thus, this has led to “self-referencing,” where institutional revision is hostage in the hands of the actors who control these institutions, and benefit out of them.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. 10 & 105 “particular institutions exist because it is expected to serve interests.”

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. 60 “because the sequence in which alternative proposals are considered determines the eventual outcome, tremendous power rests with those actors who select the sequence.” 62 “the causal story is not about temporal order at all—it is about the institutional structure and the resources and preferences of the key strategic actors. Sequence reveals how powerful actors get what they want.”

¹⁸⁰ Michael E. O'Hanlon, "The Iraqi Constitution: Potentially Fatal Flaw", The Brookings Institution http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2005/0902iraq_ohanlon.aspx (accessed). and, Jonathan Morrow, "Weak Viability: The Iraqi Federal State and the

and institutionalized their behaviors.¹⁸¹ Through such means, these elites “shifted the rules in their favor ... and increased their own capacities for political action while diminishing those of their rivals ... to reinforce their trends.”¹⁸² Hence, these elites designed, wielded power, and determined the shape and characteristic of the entire state through the “structure of rules” that bound actors even beyond the reach of the elites, formalizing their approach.¹⁸³ This minimizes the possibilities for change in Iraq since this accounts for the resilience of the institutions that this paper is advocating to reform.¹⁸⁴ Therefore, unless this system is reformed to promote moderation and unity, and unclog the political system, Iraq does not have a chance to become a stable, unified, and democratic country.¹⁸⁵ Life support machines—coalition military presence and diplomatic pressure—will always be necessary;¹⁸⁶ otherwise

Constitutional Amendment Process", United States Institute For Peace <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr168.html> (accessed 10/21 2008).

¹⁸¹ Michael E. O'Hanlon, (accessed). And: Morrow, (accessed).

¹⁸² Pierson. 36.

¹⁸³ Ibid. 60.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. 106 “particular institutions may be functional for powerful actors but quite dysfunctional for society as a whole.” 142, 143, & 144.

¹⁸⁵ March and Olsen. 735 “Historically, political theory has treated political institutions as determining, ordering, or modifying individual motives, and as acting autonomously in terms of institutional needs”

¹⁸⁶ III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 8 “include milestones that can strengthen the government and benefit the Iraqi people ... If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance” 16 “Maliki has publicly rejected a U.S. timetable to achieve certain benchmarks, ordered the removal of blockades around Sadr City, sought more control over Iraqi security forces, and resisted

Iraqi and international efforts will fail, resources will be wasted,¹⁸⁷ and the world will suffer dire consequences of such a failure, as this study demonstrates in its conclusion.

For all of these reasons, the situation in Iraq is as it is today.¹⁸⁸ So far, and after more than six years, not a single goal of the original objective of OIF has been achieved. Moreover, after all the invested efforts, and costs, still an understanding among the Iraqi elites on basic issues like the accountability and reconciliation law—also known as Debathification,—the revenue sharing law, a genuine and proper DDR, etc., are not attained. What makes this picture even gloomier is that the goals, ideologies, and, agendas of the majority of these entities runs counter to the American objective in Iraq. As such, the political process

U.S. requests to move forward on reconciliation or on disbanding Shiite militias.” 19 “Though Prime Minister Maliki has said he will address the problem of militias, he has taken little meaningful action to curb their influence. He owes his office in large part to Sadr and has shown little willingness to take on him or his Mahdi Army.”

¹⁸⁷ Abdul-Ahad. Three officers from the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INSI) stated that: “Observers not steeped in Iraqi history might be bemused to find that six years after the toppling of a dictator, after the death of several hundred thousand Iraqis, a brutal insurgency, trillions of wasted dollars and more than 4,000 dead US soldiers, the country is being rebuilt along very familiar lines: concentration of power, shadowy intelligence services and corruption.”

¹⁸⁸ *Conducting a Conflict Assessment - a Framework for Strategy and Program Development*. 31 “conflict is extremely complex. It doesn't occur simply because people are unhappy or greedy or because a country happens to have the resources in place that might sustain violence. Nor does it happen everywhere state and social institutions are weak or perverse. It happens when causes found at multiple levels come together and reinforce each other. Ultimately the product of deep grievance, political and economic competition, irresponsible political leadership, weak and unaccountable institutions, and global and regional forces.”

in Iraq became the major obstacle in achieving the strategic objective of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Given what has been discussed and documented this far, one cannot help but ask whether Iraq is a democracy, or even on the path to becoming a democracy? The unfortunate answer to both questions is no.¹⁸⁹ Then, another issue surfaces: If Iraq is not a democracy, why not?

¹⁸⁹ Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (January 2002). Iraq holds the worst characteristics of feckless pluralism, and some characteristics of dominant power politics: 9, 10, 11 & 15 "have some attributes of democratic political life ... regular elections and democratic constitutions. Yet they suffer from serious democratic deficits, often including poor representation of citizens' interests, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, and very low levels of public confidence in state institutions, and persistently poor institutional performance by the state... As a first analytic step, two broad political syndromes can be seen to be common in the gray zone ... The first syndrome is feckless pluralism ... where democracy remains shallow and troubled. Political participation, though broad at election time, extends little beyond voting. Political elites from all the major parties or groupings are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, and ineffective. The alternation of power seems only to trade the country's problems back and forth from one hapless side to the other. Political elites from all the major parties are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest, and not serious about working for their country. The public is seriously disaffected from politics, and ... extremely unhappy about the political life of the country. Overall, politics is widely seen as a stale, corrupt, elite-dominated domain that delivers little good to the country and commands equally little respect. And the state remains persistently weak. Economic policy is often poorly conceived and executed, and economic performance is frequently bad or even calamitous. Social and political reforms are similarly tenuous, and successive governments are unable to make headway on most of the major problems facing the country, from crime and corruption to health, education, and public welfare generally ... There are many variations of feckless pluralism. In some cases, the parties that alternate power between them are divided by paralyzing acrimony and devote their time out of power to preventing the other party from accomplishing anything at all ... In other cases, the main competing groups end up colluding, formally or informally, rendering the alternation of power unhelpful in a different manner ... In some countries afflicted with feckless pluralism, the political competition is between deeply entrenched parties that essentially operate as patronage networks and seem never to renovate themselves, ... These varied cases nonetheless share a common condition that seems at the root of feckless pluralism—the whole class of political elites, though plural and competitive, are profoundly cut off from the citizenry, rendering political life an ultimately hollow, unproductive exercise..." As for dominant power politics Iraq retains the following characteristics "... the blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party (or ruling political forces). The state's main assets—that is to say, the state as a source of money, jobs, public information (via state media), and police power—are

And, why have all these efforts failed to produce the desired results? The answer is that the efforts have not produced a democracy because of the mischaracterization of the root cause of the problem in Iraq as stated earlier. Strategies that aim to answer the problems in Iraq and fulfill the strategic objective of OIF must correctly assess the nature of the problems in order to formulate the way forward.

The conflict in Iraq is largely understood to be sectarian or ethnic, when this conflict is actually and overwhelmingly a power struggle. Moreover, the dominant elites in Iraq, and the political system that has been emplaced in Iraq, neither allow for consolidation of democracy, nor even for stability. Therefore, the system implemented in Iraq has failed because it presupposes that:

To preserve their position in government ...
community leaders are thought to promote conciliation
among their followers and to encourage acceptance of
the settlement. Under these arrangements, each

gradually put in the direct service of the ruling party ... the blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party (or ruling political forces). The state's main assets—that is to say, the state as a source of money, jobs, public information (via state media), and police power—are gradually put in the direct service of the ruling party... In many “transitional countries,” reasonably regular, genuine elections are held but political participation beyond voting remains shallow and governmental accountability is weak. The wide gulf between political elites and citizens in many of these countries turns out to be rooted in structural conditions, such as the concentration of wealth or certain socio-cultural traditions that elections themselves do not overcome. It is also striking how often electoral competition does little to stimulate the renovation or development of political parties in many gray-zone countries.” So Iraq is a combination of feckless pluralism, and Dominant Power Politics, where it combines the negative connotations of both. And: Terry L. Mitchell, "Is Iraq a Real Democracy?", The American Chronicle <http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/98275> (accessed 04/13/ 2009). “I have a hard time buying into the notion that Iraq is a true democracy. Yes, since the U.S. forced Saddam Hussein from power, Iraq has conducted free and open elections and has selected its own leaders. However, there's more to a democracy than just elections, and I see Iraq as lacking in some of the other things that make a democracy a democracy. Two of them specifically lead me to question that country's status as such.”

distinct religious, linguistic or nationalistic community, it is argued, will feel that their voice counts and the rules of the game are fair and legitimate, as their leaders are in a position to express their concerns and protect their interests within the legislature and within government.¹⁹⁰

In Iraq, the elites have instigated the violence, not the masses. Such a system would provide a remedy for a conflict that is mass-lead; not for a conflict that is lead by self-absorbed elites, which would prey even on masses from their own identities to strengthen their positions.¹⁹¹ Therefore, such a system does not answer to the problems in Iraq.

Tarik Al-Hashimi the Vice President of Iraq, called for “the restructuring of the Presidency Council and Cabinet by doing away with the sectarian quota.”¹⁹² Al-Hashimi “called for the formation of a national salvation government based on patriotism and away from sectarianism ... He said: ‘We have to move quickly, and I place before my fellow Iraqi citizens and politicians an urgent salvation plan to end the

¹⁹⁰ Norris, *Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* 4.

¹⁹¹ Duss and Juul. 1 “The elections and their aftermath promise to be contentious and potentially bloody as Iraq’s three main ethnic and religious groups—the minority Kurds and Sunni Arabs and the majority Shia Arabs—vie for power. More troubling still, factions within each of these ethnic and sectarian groups will contend for power in the regions they dominate—using local patronage and control of Iraq’s resources, revenues, and guns, as well as appeals based on longstanding religious traditions in Iraq ... three dominant and fiercely independent Shia political organizations—the Da’wa Party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, or ISCI, and the Sadrists, along with the smaller but still significant Fadhila—will attempt through the ballot box and armed conflict to secure a majority of Shia votes in Iraq in order to lead the country’s Shia-majority provinces.”

¹⁹² Jamal, (accessed).

distribution of posts (according to sects, religions and identity) for the sake of a wider participation.”¹⁹³

As such, without reforming the existing political system and electoral process to answer to the Iraqi context’s specificities, and without changing the dominant forces in Iraq and the way politics in Iraq are undertaken today, Iraq’s best hedge for lasting stability is the reversion to autocracy. The Iraq Study Group concluded that “the Iraqi people could be subjected to another strongman who flexes the political and military muscle required to impose order amid anarchy.¹⁹⁴ Freedoms could be lost.”¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, Paul Bremer acknowledged that compromise on such elements of democracy as a “professional, and uncorrupted police force, human rights ... no militias”,¹⁹⁶ none of which has been successfully attained, can lead the situation in Iraq to “descend into chaos or civil war or tyranny—or all three.”¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ "Iraqi V.P. Calls for Forming Nat'L Gov'T to Salvage Country", (accessed).

¹⁹⁴ Abdul-Ahad. Three officers from the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INSI) stated that: “Al-Maliki is running a government inside a government”, bypassing ministers and parliament ... a dictatorship - everything is run by his office and advisers, he is surrounded by his party and clan members. They form a tight knot that is running Iraq now. He is not building a country, he is building a state for his own party and his own people.”

¹⁹⁵ III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 28.

¹⁹⁶ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 203.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.* 204.

To cite an example in recent history, Iraq's best hope under the current setup is to develop along the lines of Russia's transition after the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁸ The obsession of the Russian elites with their selfish power and interests¹⁹⁹ is similar to the picture this study is drawing about the dominant Iraqi elites.

In 1991, 70% of the Russian population was "prepared to see Russia move toward a liberal democracy."²⁰⁰ Many of the Russian people "were unsure what exactly democracy was, but they accepted it as both an idea and as a way of life."²⁰¹ As developments took place, uncertainty and instability became rampant, the Russian people's main concerns came to be safety, wellbeing, order, and, stability.²⁰² The outcome is that, in 2006, 71% of Russians regretted the dissolution of the USSR,²⁰³ and, supported and embraced the reversal of the democratization process.²⁰⁴ Iraqis also wanted to see a democratic Iraq.²⁰⁵ From dancing

¹⁹⁸ Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 30

¹⁹⁹ Lilia Shevtsova, *Russia Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies* (Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2007). 10 "Yeltsin and his ruling team ... not only did they not try to establish a new national consensus on democratic reforms, their egocentrism deepened the divisions within the society, goading elites into warring among themselves over who was to get their hands on property and power ... the elite that rose to the top after the collapse of the USSR was split into competing groups each claiming monopoly on power."

²⁰⁰ Ibid. 13.

²⁰¹ Ibid. 13.

²⁰² Ibid. 16.

²⁰³ Ibid. 16.

²⁰⁴ Ibid. 16 & 37.

in the streets and welcoming Americans as liberators to where Iraq is today,²⁰⁶ the resemblance with the Russian people's shift in mood is stark.

There is a particular characteristic of the Russian transition's end result which would be particularly repellent to America. The Russian de-democratization²⁰⁷ came hand-in-hand with a casting aside of all the policies of "Western integration."²⁰⁸ Russia is currently promoting a vision that is characterized by anti-western and anti-American hegemony,²⁰⁹ if not outright anti-Americanism.²¹⁰ This anti-Western stance resonates with many Russians²¹¹ because the Russian transition was seen by ordinary Russians as a Western and an American initiative.

²⁰⁵ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 204.

²⁰⁶ Sodaro. 259 "public acceptance—which was fairly high after among Iraqis in the first months after the war—deteriorated rapidly."

²⁰⁷ Tilly. 14 "Democratization means net 'involvement toward broader, more equal, more protected, and more binding consultation. De-democratization, obviously, then means-net movement toward narrower, more unequal, less protected, and less binding consultation." & 15 "Net movement of a regime toward the higher ends of the four dimensions—breadth of popular inclusion, equality among citizens, protection against arbitrary actions of the states, mutually binding consultation among the state and the citizenry—qualifies as democratization. Net movement toward the lower ends qualifies as de-democratization." Also see: Carothers. 9-14.

²⁰⁸ Dmitri Trenin, "The Lonely Power: Russian Security Policy and the West", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22683&prog=zru&zoom_highlight=Russian (accessed 03/03/ 2009).

²⁰⁹ Thomas Gomart, *E.U.-Russia Relations: Toward a Way out of Depression* (CSIS, July, 2008). 5.

²¹⁰ "Putin, Vladimir W. Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy: "Munich Security Conference <http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=179> (accessed 03/02/ 2009). Also see: Trenin, (accessed). And: Gomart. 5.

²¹¹ Gomart.

The consequences felt by the Russians were daunting,²¹² leading them to blame the west and America for their misfortunes.²¹³ Iraqis likewise see the Americans as the driving force behind the change, and attribute the consequences—good or bad—largely to such an intervention.²¹⁴ Of course in the case of Iraq, America’s direct military intervention has understandably evoked the conclusion that America is indeed responsible for the change and its consequences.²¹⁵

It is highly unlikely that any American decision-maker would like to see an outcome similar to the one in Russia, in the heart of the Middle East, in a predominantly Arab and Muslim country. Such an anti-American posture in this vital but volatile region can prove to be a very consequential issue. Just as in the case of the Russian drift away from democracy, it would be an unfortunate and devastating development for America. Not to mention, what a terrible waste of numerous lives and enormous efforts and resources such a scenario in the case of Iraq would represent.

²¹² Shevtsova. 37.

²¹³ Gomart. 5 & 6.

²¹⁴ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 112 “every adult Iraq had indeed been shocked and awed by the speed and precision with which the coalition had crushed Saddam Hussien’s vaunted Republican Guard and overthrown the Baathis regime. After such a display of superpower might, many expected us to similar miracles once the tanks stopped rolling.” The failure to do so increased “the resolve and confidence of Iraqi insurgents and terrorists.” & 160 “the Iraqi minister of Justice Hashim Al-Shibli stated ‘please remember this, Ambassador Bremer: we are looking the United States in building a New Iraq.’”

²¹⁵ Sodaro. 267.

Chapter III:

History—A Source For Lessons And Remedies

Iraq today finds itself faced with problems similar to those faced by the United States of America after its Declaration of Independence²¹⁶ and the formation of the confederation.²¹⁷ Just as rampant factional interests threatened America,²¹⁸ factional interests in Iraq today are, at best, threatening the prospects of a democratic Iraq, if not Iraq as a nation.

The type of government created under the American Articles of Confederation was too weak, and the union was malfunctioning.²¹⁹ The states were failing to comply with their duties under the Articles of Confederation.²²⁰ Many Americans realized that the survival of the United States of America and its prosperity was contingent upon solidifying and strengthening the union.²²¹ General George Washington wrote:

²¹⁶ Jack P. Greene, *Colonies to Nation 1763-1789 a Documentary History of the American Revolution* (New York . London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1975). 428 “The First National Constitution: The Articles of Confederation (Mar. 1, 1781).”

²¹⁷ Gordon S. Wood, *The American Revolution a History* (Modern Library, Random House Publishing Group, 2002). 71.

²¹⁸ Greene. 436 The states from their side also failed to comply with their duties under the Articles of Confederation.

²¹⁹ Ibid. 436 “The time of ... Political Probation”: George Washington’s circular letter to the States (June 8, 1783).

²²⁰ Ibid. 436.

²²¹ Ibid.

It appears to me there is an option still left to the United States of America ... whether they will become respectable and prosperous, or contemptible and miserable, as a nation... this is the moment to establish or ruin their national character forever; this is the favorable moment to give such a tone to our federal government, as we'll enable it to answer the ends of its institutions, or this may be the ill-fated moment for relaxing the powers of the Union, annihilating the cement of the confederation, and exposing us to become the sports of European politics ... according to the system of policy the states shall adopt at this moment, they will stand or fall; and by their confirmation or lapse it is yet to be decided, whether the revolution must ultimately be considered as a blessing or a curse ... not to the present age alone, for with our fate will the destiny of unborn millions be involved ... silence in me would be a crime ... it will be part of my duty, and that of every true patriot, to assert without reserve, and to insist ... that unless the States will suffer congress to those prerogatives they are undoubtedly invested with by the constitution, everything must very rapidly tend to anarchy and confusion. That it is indispensable to the happiness of the individual states, that there should be lodged somewhere a supreme power to regulate and govern the general concerns of the confederated republic²²²

It is puzzling that American policymakers failed to draw such parallels and apply, to Iraq, lessons learned from the American experience.²²³ It is even more puzzling that bright politicians like Vice President *Joseph R. Biden Jr.* advocated, in 2006, a solution to the overall problems in Iraq that would promote more factionalism by further dividing the country into distinct Shiite, Sunni, and, Kurdish regions.²²⁴

²²² Ibid. 437–444 “The time of ... Political Probation”: George Washington’s circular letter to the States (June 8, 1783).

²²³ "Iraqi P.M. Calls for Strong Central Government." “Maliki said ‘Iraq needs to change its laws and constitution to be able to defend its unity.’”

²²⁴ Joseph R. Biden Jr., "A Plan to Hold Iraq Together," *The Washington Post*, 08/24/2006.

This is the exact opposite of the measures that America undertook to overcome a very similar situation—to revise the Articles of Confederation and establish a government “adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”²²⁵

Had America’s founding fathers approached the problems facing their country in the way that American strategists and policymakers are approaching the problems facing Iraq, America as we know it would not have survived. Instead, the founding fathers of America were prudent enough to devise a system that transformed a loose union into a strong unified nation. As such, America arose from a country that was unable to raise money to meet its financial obligations²²⁶ and raise arms to defend itself,²²⁷ to become a superpower.

Given the challenges Iraq is facing today—the nature of its elites, the characteristics of its political system, the fate of Iraqi citizens, and the outcome of its experience so far—there are two lessons to be drawn from the American experience during its first century. These lessons are

²²⁵ Winton U. Solberg, *The Constitutional Convention and the Formation of the Union* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990). 55 & 59 “Proceedings of the Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government.” See also: 60 & 61 “The Virginia Resolution October 16, 1786;” & 62 “The Delaware Resolution February 3, 1787.”

²²⁶ Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 12," in *The Federalist*, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961). 75 & 76 and: Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 13," in *The Federalist*, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961). 80.

²²⁷ John Jay, "Federalist No. 5," in *The Federalist*, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961). 26 & 27 and: Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 6," in *The Federalist*, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961). 35 and: Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 7 " in *The Federalist*, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961). 36 & 37.

fundamental to defining the future of Iraq and the course of its nascent democratic experience: First, like America, Iraq must consolidate and strengthen its political system and its fragmented government. This will enable Iraq's government to rise to the challenges it faces, and to look after the interests of the people it represents, rather than being torn by bickering faction, as is the case in Iraq now. It is absolutely essential for the sustainability of the Iraqi democratic experience, like American, Iraq must protect against a backlash, consolidate its political system, and advance democracy. In short, such a measure is vital for the Iraqi experiment to succeed. Otherwise, prospects of democratization in Iraq will suffer severe setbacks, for, either Iraq will be subjected to another brutal dictator, or it will become the "sports"²²⁸ of other countries. Just, as General George Washington explained, in his circular letter, how such a measure was important for the survival of America, the same applies today for Iraq. It is time to decide on the future of Iraq. Is Iraq to be a consolidated democracy? Dissolve into chaos and anarchy? Or will it revert to dictatorship?²²⁹ A choice must be made: Iraqis must

²²⁸ Greene. 437- 444 "The time of ... Political Probation": George Washington's circular letter to the States (June 8, 1783).

²²⁹ "21: Nuri Al-Maliki: Prime Minister, Iraq," *Newsweek*, 12/20/ 2008. And: Sam Dagher, "A Top Sunni Survives an Attack in Iraq " *The New York Times*, 01/21/ 2009. "Maliki's partners in government, both Shiites and Kurds, accuse him of adopting an increasingly autocratic style." And: Ned Parker, "Kurdish Leader Sees Authoritarian Drift in Iraq," *Los Angeles Times*, 01/11/ 2009. And: Abdul-Ahad. Three officers from the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INSI) stated that: "We compile reports on their activities, generals' and military units' movements, and their corruption, the positions they are taking in the government and the contracts they are obtaining. But we don't know what to do with these reports because we don't trust the government."

“establish”²³⁰ or “ruin their national character forever;”²³¹ they must enable their government “to answer the ends of its institutions, or this may be the ill-fated moment for relaxing its powers.”²³²

In the mean-time, just as General George Washington warned, the suggested consolidation must avoid the oppression that occurs by vesting too much power in single government that presides over the whole of Iraq.²³³ And, as Benjamin Rush explains “absolute power should never be trusted to man. It has perverted the wisest heads, and corrupted the best hearts in the world.”²³⁴ In this respect, the responsibilities and powers must be assigned to different government branches.²³⁵ Each branch must have the means to check the conduct of the remaining two branches, and balance their authority.²³⁶

The second lesson to be drawn from the American experience during its first century is that it is absolutely essential for the

²³⁰ Greene. 437 – 444 “The time of ... Political Probation”: George Washington’s circular letter to the States (June 8, 1783).

²³¹ Ibid. 437 – 444 “The time of ... Political Probation”: George Washington’s circular letter to the States (June 8, 1783).

²³² Ibid. 437 - 444 “The time of ... Political Probation”: George Washington’s circular letter to the States (June 8, 1783).

²³³ Solberg. 363 Letter of the President of the Federal Convention to the President of the Congress, Transmitting the Constitution (September 17, 1787).

²³⁴ Greene. 360 Defects of the Pennsylvania Constitution: Benjamin Rush, “Observation Upon the present Government of Pennsylvania (1777)” Letter II.

²³⁵ Solberg. 347 - 360 The Constitution of the United States.

²³⁶ Ibid.

government to rely on the will of people.²³⁷ As James Madison—the father of the American Constitution—stated: “it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people.”²³⁸ Given the characteristics of the Iraqi context, the government should be directly accountable to the people. This will ameliorate the vice of factional interests by accounting for the individual interests of citizens.

Abraham Lincoln, in his Gettysburg address, summarized the importance of having the government rely for its power on the people and how such a government empowered by the people will enjoy durability and realize its goals:

That we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain--that this nation ... shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.²³⁹

The following Chapter proposes a system that will minimize factionalism while ensuring the widest possible popular participation. The government in the proposed system relies on the widest possible

²³⁷ Ibid. 347 & 359 The preamble, Article 1, Section 1 & Article VI [The Constitution of the United States] the US constitution provided the remedy by empowering the people over the states in the House of Representatives and through its supremacy clause.

²³⁸ James Madison, in *The Federalist*, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1787). 355 [The Federalist No. 52 - To the People of the State New York].

²³⁹ "16. Abraham Lincoln 1861-1865", The White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/AbrahamLincoln/> (accessed 04/10/2009).

support of the citizens; at the same time, it guarantees unity of command that is checked by institutional oversight.

Such measures will break the tight control of elites over Iraq, and break the ongoing clientelistic²⁴⁰ patterns of despotism carried on from previous eras. The goal, opportunity and challenge central to this chapter and, indeed, the entire study best captured in Richard Price's letter "A New Prospect in Human Affairs' ... 'Observation on the importance of the American Revolution' (1784):"

That the members of a civil community are ... not subjects; and their rulers, *servants*, not *masters*.— And that all legitimate government consists in the dominion of equal laws made with common consent; that is, in the dominion of men over *themselves*; and not in the dominion of communities over communities, or of any men over other men ... The Present moment, however auspicious to the united States if wisely approved, is critical; and, though apparently the end of all their dangers, may prove the time their greatest danger ... Should ... excessive jealousy district their governments; and, clashing interests, subject to no controul, break the federal union—the consequences will be, that the fairest experiment ever tried in human affairs will miscarry; and that a REVOLUTION which had revived the hopes of good men and promised an opening to better times, will become a discouragement to all future efforts in favour of liberty, and prove only

²⁴⁰ Brian Kermath, "What Is Clientelism?", University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point http://www.uwsp.edu/cnr/gem/ambassador/what_is_clientelism.htm (accessed 04/10/ 2009). "Clientelism refers to a form of social organization common in many developing regions characterized by 'patron-client' relationships. In such places, relatively powerful and rich 'patrons' promise to provide relatively powerless and poor 'clients' with jobs, protection, infrastructure, and other benefits in exchange for votes and other forms of loyalty including labor ... these relationships are typically exploitative, often resulting in the perpetual indebtedness of the clients in what is described as a 'debt peonage' relationship. In some instances, patrons employ coercion, intimidation, sabotage, and even violence to maintain control, and some fail to deliver on their promises. Moreover, patrons are often unaccountable for their actions. Thus, clientelistic relationships are often corrupt and unfair, thereby obstructing the processes of implementing true sustainability."

an opening to a new scene of human degeneracy and misery.²⁴¹

The system proposed in this study thus provides for leaders that fall on their merits rather than their identities, and provides them the incentives to “preserve, protect, and defend”²⁴² Iraq, its citizens as Iraqis, and its democratic experience. The proposed system will allow for the emergence of leaders that “strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds....”²⁴³

Further, Thomas Jefferson’s remarks on the Virginia Constitution typically applies to the case of Iraq: i.e.,²⁴⁴

This constitution was formed when we were new and un-experienced in the science of government ... No wonder then that time and trial have discovered very capital defects in it ... The majority of the men in the state, who pay and fight for its support, are unrepresented ... among those who share the representation, the shares are very unequal.²⁴⁵

The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri Al-Maliki, seems to have a similar conviction. Al-Maliki has stated the current political system is a major

²⁴¹ Greene. 424 & 425 “A New Prospect in Human Affairs”: Richard Price, “Observation on the importance of the American Revolution” (1784). Also see: Linz and Stepan. 29 “Democracy is characterized not by subjects but by citizens.”

²⁴² "16. Abraham Lincoln 1861-1865", (accessed). Abraham Lincoln’s warning to the South in his Inaugural Address.

²⁴³ Ibid., (accessed). In his planning for peace ... After Lincoln won re-election in 1864, as Union military triumphs heralded an end to the war.

²⁴⁴ Sodaro. 262.

²⁴⁵ Greene. 369 Weaknesses Of The Virginia Constitution: Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on the State of Virginia” (1781-1782).

challenge in the way of progress in Iraq.²⁴⁶ On Saturday, November, 8 2008, Al-Maliki, acknowledged that the Iraqi constitution was written “in haste,’ when Iraq was in a ‘transitional stage,’ and that the time has come to revise it.”²⁴⁷ He stated that Iraqis went too far in enshrining fears and insecurities of the past into the political system. These fears and insecurities were translated in the form of sectarian and ethnic quotas. Furthermore, Al-Maliki stated this is restricting the government, wasting the Iraqi capabilities, and, imposing inefficient figures on the Iraqi political system. He also called on Iraqis to reconsider the form of the Iraqi political system.²⁴⁸ Al-Maliki stressed the necessity for clearly defining the jurisdictions of the central and provincial governments²⁴⁹ and, advocated a strong central government.²⁵⁰ The Iraqi people seem to agree also on such a vision,²⁵¹ for, Al-Maliki ran on such a platform, and the people rewarded him.²⁵² He won the elections by large margins²⁵³

²⁴⁶ Yacoub.

²⁴⁷ Bushra Juhil, "Iraq Still Needs Us Military, Official Says," *The Associated Press*, 11/08/ 2008. And: "Iraqi P.M. Calls for Strong Central Government."

²⁴⁸ Juhil. And: "Iraqi P.M. Calls for Strong Central Government."

²⁴⁹ Juhil.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 40 & 41.

²⁵² Sam Dagher and Steven Lee Myer, "Iraq Voters Heed Calls for Strong Central State," *International Herald Tribune*, 02/03/ 2009. And: "Iraq's Winning Vote," *The Washington Post*, 02/04/ 2009. And: "Iraqi P.M. Calls for Strong Central Government."

²⁵³ Dagher and Myer, "Iraq Voters Heed Calls for Strong Central State." And: Alissa J. Rubin, "Secular Parties and Premier Lead in Iraq " *The New York Times*, 02/01/ 2009.

considering Iraq's proportional representation system. He ousted rival political entities in the Shiite provinces that wanted to further fragment Iraq along sectarian lines by establishing a purely Shiite region in the south.²⁵⁴ The defeat of these factions is testimony that the majority of Shiites are against such a concept.²⁵⁵ However, as emphasized throughout this study, the interactions of elites and the electoral system are hindering translating the voters' choice to authority.²⁵⁶

And: "Iraq's Winning Vote." And: Missy Ryan, "Iraq's Maliki Emerges as Forceful Nationalist," *Reuters*, 02/05/ 2009. And: Hoagland.

²⁵⁴ "Iraq's Winning Vote." And: "Failing to Collect Enough Signatures: Basra Autonomy Referendum Petition Fails," *Al-Arabiya*, 01/21/ 2009. and: Ryan.

²⁵⁵ "Iraq's Winning Vote."

²⁵⁶ Christoph Bangert, "Iraq Provinces Try to Overcome Political Disarray," *The New York Times*, 04/15/ 2009.

Chapter IV:

Reforming the Iraqi Electoral system

Restructuring the electoral system is vital to achieve the strategic objective of OIF. Former Iraqi Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi, rightly stated that:

Unfortunately, neither Washington nor the government of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki seems to understand that reconciliation between Iraq's ethnic and religious groups will begin only when we change the flawed electoral system ... This restructuring of the electoral process will be the beginning of the end of the sectarianism that now dominates Iraqi politics and our dysfunctional government.²⁵⁷

Electoral systems in any state are consequential, and vital for shaping any political system.²⁵⁸ The characteristics of any state highly depend on its political system.²⁵⁹ The political system determines how people are represented, how the institutions are shaped and developed, and even highly influences the actions of the elites.²⁶⁰ Electoral systems determine the “structure of the party system, the ways in which

²⁵⁷ Allawi.

²⁵⁸ Sisk. 1, 2, & 3 And: Stone. 288 & 295. Also see: Horowitz. 116.

²⁵⁹ Sisk. 1 “the political pathway of transition and especially the initial, post-war electoral process matters for significantly for state-building. The transition sequences and institutional choices made in war-settlement negotiations often determine the nature and timing of initial post-war elections; in turn, these electoral processes deeply affect the nature of the state that emerges for years to follow.” And: Stone. 354 And: Kenneth N. Waltz, “Political Structures,” in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, Ed. , 27-46. , ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 74.

²⁶⁰ Stone. 354, 355, 356 & 375 and: March and Olsen. 738 “the new institutionalism insists on a more autonomous role for political institutions. The state is not only affected by society but also affects it. Political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions.”

candidates craft their appeals, and the overall character of the contest.”²⁶¹

The first step must be to tackle the dangers of a faction. As James Madison wrote “Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction ... this dangerous vice.”²⁶² The objective of the formation of government must be “to secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government.”²⁶³

The chapter proposes politically systemic changes that foster democratic political competition based on the interests of the people rather than identities. Furthermore, such changes are required to ensure smooth and decisive action by a unified government to meet its obligations²⁶⁴ rather than a government torn by the struggle of power, and the vice of faction. The advocated solution is based on the necessity to settle and filter differences outside the government, and through

²⁶¹ Sisk. And: Hall and Taylor. 937 & 938 “institutional organization of the polity or political economy as the principal factor structuring collective behavior and generating distinctive outcomes ... the state is no longer a neutral broker among competing interests but a complex of institutions capable of structuring the character and outcome of group conflict.”

²⁶² Madison. 56 & 57 “The Federalist No. 10 - To the People of the State New York.”

²⁶³ Ibid. 61 “The Federalist No. 10 - To the People of the State New York.”

²⁶⁴ Jerome G. Kerwin, “The Presidential Elections,” *The Review of Politics* 10, no. 2 (1948). 148.

electoral competition.²⁶⁵ The theoretical foundation for such a remedy is that:

Elections are the principal means ... to determine initial control of state institutions by either affirming existing patterns of power or ushering in new elites and by re-arranging state-society relations ... the extent to which electoral processes contribute to capable, responsive states and to other alternatives such as captured, fragmented, or weak states ... In some circumstances, electoral processes *are* the critical turning point that ends an uncertain, and usually turbulent, transition period and may in fact be the key ingredient in moving beyond the vulnerabilities of post-war settings to ongoing political violence.²⁶⁶

Such “electoral engineering”—changing the formal electoral rules—has the capacity to generate major consequences by altering the strategic behavior of politicians, parties, and citizens.”²⁶⁷ “The challenge ... is to devise electoral rules that compel serious candidates to secure significant cross-factional support.”²⁶⁸

Essentially, instead of the infusion of powers, the concept of separation of powers needs to be introduced in Iraq.²⁶⁹ Each branch of government—legislative, executive, and, judicial—must not depend on

²⁶⁵ Ibid. 148.

²⁶⁶ Sisk. 1, 2, & 3.

²⁶⁷ Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. 8.

²⁶⁸ Hall and Taylor. 937 “institutional organization of the polity and economy structures conflict so as to privilege some interests while demobilizing others.” The same argument can be applied to privileging types of actors.

²⁶⁹ Hazan. 30 & 31 “in parliamentarism the executive emerges from and is responsible to the legislature—a fusion of executive and legislative powers, or power sharing; whereas in presidentialism, there exists a separation of executive origin and survival from the legislature—a separation of powers.”

any other branch for its existence, but on the will of the people.²⁷⁰ Each branch of government needs to have separate responsibilities,²⁷¹ as well as authorities to examine the performance of the other branches and balance their power.

While the purely parliamentary system needs to be revoked,²⁷² the proposed remedy does not follow the rigid and clear theoretical line of political systems²⁷³ proscribed in political science—Parliamentary, Presidential,²⁷⁴ or semi-Presidential.²⁷⁵ Instead, the reformed system

²⁷⁰ Solberg. 94 Mr. Dickenson's opinion, & 347-360 [The Constitution of the United States] See Article I Section 7, Article 2 Section 2, and, Article III section 2.

²⁷¹ Sodaro. 195.

²⁷² Hazan. 27 "Having reached such a precarious state, it finally became evident to all involved that the time had come to improve Israel's incapacitated parliamentary system, and to make the political system more efficient and stable."

²⁷³ Ibid. 33 "can the new regime in Israel be made to fit any of the already elaborated models? If the answer must be unequivocal, then it is no."

²⁷⁴ "The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis," in *The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*, ed. Poguntke and Paul Webb (Oxford University Press, 2005). 1 & 2 "*The executive must be politically irresponsible to the legislature.* The separation of powers is the classic core condition of presidentialism, which ensures that the executive is not accountable to the legislature nor removable by it. Rather, the president is accountable only to the electorate which furnished his or her mandate to govern ... Exceptionally, as in the American case, a president may be subject to impeachment by the legislature for reasons of gross impropriety or misconduct, but as Verney (1959) points out in his classic account of presidentialism, this is not so much an example of political accountability as it is of juridical control ... For a political system to merit the presidential label in a formal sense, the president must be the true head of government, and the most common (if not only) way in which such status can be conferred in a democracy is for the president to be popularly elected, either directly by the people or via an electoral college which closely reflects the popular preferences of the electorate ... *Presidential regimes are characterized by uni-personal executive responsibility.* Under presidentialism, only the president is mandated to govern by the people, and therefore, only he or she is politically accountable. This does not mean, of course, that the executive literally comprises a single individual; the US President, for instance, appoints the members of his cabinet, who take charge of policy in different government departments, but they are not individually responsible to the electorate (or to the legislature, given the separation of powers which operates). Only the president himself

advocated here shares some characteristics of the parliamentary, mixed presidential and purely presidential systems.²⁷⁶ Central to the advocated alternative is the creation of direct state-society relations, and, the presidentialization of politics.²⁷⁷ This conforms to the specificities of the Iraqi cultural context.

has a personal democratic mandate, which means that he has complete authority to hire and fire members of his cabinet, and they are accountable directly to him: he then carries responsibility for the entire administration ... It seems to us that these three features of a popularly elected executive, the separation of executive and legislative power, and uni-personal executive responsibility constitute the necessary and sufficient formal conditions which define presidentialism in a legal-constitutional sense. While the actual autonomy and power of a president may vary considerably within these constitutional parameters according to a variety of contingent and institutional factors, it nevertheless remains formally a presidential regime.”

²⁷⁵ Ibid. 3 “semi-presidential regimes are 'double-engine systems' characterized by dyarchic executives. That is, not only do they have popularly elected heads of state who are politically not responsible to the legislature and have a degree of real executive power, but this power must also in some way be shared with a separate prime minister, the latter being formally the head of a government which emerges from the legislature and is responsible to it (Duverger 1980 ; Linz 1994 : 48; Sartori 1994 : 131ff.; Elgie 1999 : 13). Thus, a semi-presidential regime mixes core elements of presidentialism and parliamentarism. Its actual working mode is directly dependent upon presence or absence of party political congruence between the president and the parliamentary majority.”

²⁷⁶ Hazan. 27, 30 “The Israeli reformers have attempted to create a system that will be the best of both worlds. Their aim was to maintain their parliamentary system, tempering its drawbacks by introducing the positive elements of a presidential system, while avoiding the disruptive and unstable characteristics of both pure regime types;” 31 “Israel will, therefore, move away from the parliamentary form of governments and into a unique and hybrid category, but will not transform itself into a presidential regime. Israel will no longer be purely parliamentary, but it will also not conform to the pure presidential type;” 32 “If Israel is not presidential, nor even semi-presidential, then maybe a hybrid model,” 33 “Israel, in short, will move out of the pure parliamentary category but will definitely not become purely presidential, nor semi-presidential,” & 35.

²⁷⁷ "The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis." 1 “personalization, and in particular, the 'presidentialization' of politics have become more widespread in recent years, regardless of formal constitutional characteristics. For instance, in the United Kingdom long-standing concerns about prime ministerial power have occasionally produced assertions of 'presidential' rule, most notably in the work of Foley (1993 , 2000) ... *presidentialization* denominates a process by which regimes are becoming more presidential in their actual practice without, in most cases, changing their formal structure, that is, their regime-type.” & 3&4 “The preceding discussion has shown that presidential systems offer far more

The Iraqi National Assembly and the Chief Executive must be elected directly by the people.²⁷⁸ The following measures are suggested to reform the electoral rules pertaining to the executive and legislative branches of Iraqi state.

- A. Under the proposed system, the chief executive—as opposed to the head of state²⁷⁹—is directly elected by the people.²⁸⁰ “Popular mandate is an essential precondition of the executive’s democratic legitimacy and,

executive power resources to the leader of the executive while, at the same time, giving him or her considerable *autonomy* vis-à-vis the political parties in parliament (and vice versa). Essentially, the inherent functional logic of presidential regimes has three effects: *Leadership power resources ... Leadership autonomy ... Personalization of the electoral process ...* It follows from this that the de facto presidentialization of politics can be understood as the development of (a) increasing leadership power resources and autonomy within the party and the political executive respectively, and (b) increasingly leadership-centered electoral processes. Essentially, three central arenas of democratic government are affected by these changes, which we may refer to as three faces of presidentialization, namely *the executive face*, *the party face*, and *the electoral face*, respectively. Presidentialization as a process means that these three faces of presidentialization are amplified by factors other than those flowing directly from the formal constitutional structure. In principle, all regime-types can move (to varying degrees) between partyified and presidentialized forms of government. How closely they approach either of the opposing poles of this continuum is determined by a wide range of underlying structural factors (such as changes in the social structure and the media system) and contingent factors (such as the personality of leaders).”

²⁷⁸ Solberg. 347 & 354 Article 1, Section 1 & Article 2 Section 1 [The Constitution of the United States] and: Hazan. 25 “an electoral reform which synthesized both parliamentary and presidential systems of government—the Prime Minister would no longer be chosen by the parliament following post-election coalition bargaining, but would be directly elected by the population in a separate ballot.”

²⁷⁹ Hazan. 30 “the direct election of the head of government, as opposed to the head of state, will put Israel in an even smaller group.”

²⁸⁰ “The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis.” 1 and: Hazan. 28 “the Prime Minister will be chosen based on general, national, direct, equal, and secret elections. The tenure of the Prime Minister is to be concurrent with that of the Knesset (four years), and they are to be elected simultaneously.” & 31 “In the Israeli case the chief executive will be selected directly by the electorate.” & 33 “the terminology of calling the popularly elected executive leader in Israel by the title of Prime Minister, instead of President.”

therefore, for his or her personal authority to govern.”²⁸¹ As such, s/he will be mainly responsible to the electorate,²⁸² and less responsible to political elites. This will also immensely increase the legitimacy of the government.²⁸³

Also, the chief executive will be able to appoint the members of his/her branch of government.²⁸⁴ Of course the confirmation of cabinet members is contingent upon the approval of parliament, to check, and balance the authority of the executive.²⁸⁵

According to the Iraqi constitution, the Prime Minister is the chief executive; therefore, the PM will be able to appoint cabinet members. This will promote cohesiveness²⁸⁶ and unity inside the cabinet.²⁸⁷ Hence, this step will also lead to a more durable,²⁸⁸ effective, and stable system.²⁸⁹

²⁸¹ "The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis." 2.

²⁸² Ibid. 1.

²⁸³ Blais. 255 “those elected enjoy strong support, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of government.”

²⁸⁴ "The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis." 2 & 3 “This emanates directly from the fact that he or she is not responsible to parliament, is usually directly legitimated and has the power to form a cabinet without significant interference from other institutions.”

²⁸⁵ Solberg. 356 The Constitution of the United States of America, Article II.

²⁸⁶ Blais. 241. And: Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. 5 “in 1992 israel introduced direct elections for the prime minister to create a stronger executive capable of counterbalancing party fragmentation in the Knesset and overcoming the problems of frequent government turnover.”

²⁸⁷ Blais. 241.

Further, such a change will allow for a clearer and much more transparent allocation of responsibility, and will, therefore, facilitate the process of government accountability,²⁹⁰ since only the executive is accountable to the people and the legislative for his/her own performance—uni-personal responsibility.²⁹¹ It will be quite evident where to place the blame. Unlike the current multi-party, proportional, consociational, and parliamentary system that is emplaced in Iraq, blame, under the proposed system cannot be diffused. There is a *de facto* “uni-personal executive responsibility.”²⁹²

This proposed system also promotes autonomy in action. The executive is far less dependent for his /her power on the legislative branch, or on parties and party elites. Therefore, his/her main concern will be the people. As such, the chief executive will be able to take decisive²⁹³ measures and necessary decisions without worrying about losing their power, even if the actions were directed against power nodes.

²⁸⁸ Ibid. 241.

²⁸⁹ Ibid. 241& 242.

²⁹⁰ Ibid. 242 & 243.

²⁹¹ "The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis." 2.

²⁹² Ibid. 2.

²⁹³ Blais. 242.

The presidentialized power of the state-society model will serve as a welcomed solution to patronage,²⁹⁴ corruption,²⁹⁵ interparty differences, and intraparty cleavages.²⁹⁶ The main source of executive power will reside in the public.²⁹⁷ Such an approach facilitates a transcending of the retroactive influence of political parties²⁹⁸ and political elites²⁹⁹ by directly interlinking the interests of the public and executive.

However, a public that grants power to the executive; along with the other two branches of government—legislative and judiciary—holds the executive responsible and in check for her/his performance (see footnote for further explanation).³⁰⁰

²⁹⁴ Dagher, "Iraqi Report on Corruption Cites Prosecutors' Barriers." "The real problem is the difficulty of prosecuting people for corruption, which is so widespread that it has become one of the main obstacles to stability and progress in Iraq, according to Iraqi and American officials."

²⁹⁵ Ibid. "The reason for the massive corruption in Iraq is the belief by the corrupt that they are shielded from prosecution by the protection afforded to them by their political parties and sects," said Rahim al-Okaili, the commissioner of the anticorruption group, the Commission on Public Integrity ...' Commissioner Okaili bemoans that his own institution is riddled with corruption and cronyism."

²⁹⁶ Hazan. 28 "Moreover, direct popular elections became perceived as the 'real' change, almost as a panacea for curing the malaise of the entire system."

²⁹⁷ Stone. 307 persuasion is key for any person to rise to the office of chief executive. Since, s/he has to persuade diverse people of different backgrounds of his/her merits. Hence, "by persuasion we bring out the highest human quality—the capacity to deliberate," 308 "the purpose of persuasion is to elicit active response." & 309.

²⁹⁸ "The Presidentialization of Contemporary Democratic Politics: Evidence, Causes, and Consequences," in *The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*, ed. Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (Oxford University Press, 2005). 3 "While in office, the head of the executive is well protected against pressure from his own party."

²⁹⁹ Ibid. 3.

³⁰⁰ To strengthen the check on the executive branch: Hazan. 29 "the parliament can remove a minister with an extraordinary majority ... the parliament can also oust the Prime Minister, as well, through a vote of no-confidence" by a super majority of 85%

The formula works as follows: The greater the level of satisfaction among the public, the stronger the executive,³⁰¹ and the less space there is available for parties to maneuver. Consequently, if the executive fails to serve the public's interest, then the checks and balances formula of the separation of powers becomes active. This step will create double pressure on the executive, and a greater momentum for checks and balances, particularly when both the legislative and the public join to exert pressure on the executive. Furthermore, parties and political elites marginalized by this system will become vocal in outlining any mischief on the part of the executive.³⁰² They will become quick to recognize and

and the approval of the president or the presidency council. "the removal of the Prime Minister brings about the dissolution of the parliament as well, meaning that new elections will be necessary for both ... the Prime Minister-with the support of the President, a symbolic position elected by the Parliament-has the power to dissolve the parliament, but such a step would also end the Prime Minister's own tenure and force new elections." Furthermore, since there are concerns that: Juan Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?," in *The Failure of Presidential Democracy. Comparative Perspectives.*, ed. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 13 "there is no way to hold accountable a president who cannot be presented for reelection. Such a president can neither be punished by the voters by defeat nor rewarded for success by reelection with the same or a larger vote than in the previous election. A president who cannot be reelected is 'unaccountable.'" Hence, to hold the chief executive further accountable s/he will be able to rerun for elections; 17 & 18 However, to mitigate the fear of concentration of power and possible manipulation and abuse of power by the chief executives—in the case of Iraq the Prime Minister—as well as the fear of seizing power in undemocratic means, s/he cannot hold official posts for two consecutive terms. This means that the chief executive at a given term will be forbidden from holding any official office in the next term. This will incentivize the chief executive to further heed to his/her responsibilities by providing for continuity, while at the same time mitigating the risks of allowing a person to hold the post consecutively and/or indefinitely, hence, institutionally prevent any person from seizing power and abusing his/her authority.

³⁰¹ "The Presidentialization of Contemporary Democratic Politics: Evidence, Causes, and Consequences." 3 "power to lead depends directly on his electoral appeal. In other words, leadership autonomy may make for enhanced power to lead, but it is contingent upon electoral success." And: Stone. 365.

reveal issues that might tarnish the executive's reputation and will do so to further their own self interests.

The UN and the CPA dismissed this option. The rationale for their decision was that under such a system—known as *majoritairan*—the winner takes all. Hence, many people would be left out, and their views would go unrepresented. As such, grievances would emerge and violence would escalate. However, there is an answer to such a legitimate concern, and the answer forms the absolutely essential foundation of the proposed change.

Given the context in Iraq, the requirements for electing the executive must not be only a 50%+ vote by the electorate, but the vote must be complemented by a condition that the candidate must acquire a certain percentage of votes in 16 out of the 18 provinces in Iraq.³⁰³ This is

³⁰² March and Olsen. 738 the system of checks and balances as well as competition will minimize the “Chief executives advocate reorganization of the public bureaucracy, announce plans for making reorganizations, and regularly abandon the plans.”

³⁰³ Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?." 44 Advocates of presidentialism argue that a president who is elected by a statewide electorate can serve as a symbol of integration in spite of ethnic divisions. The success of such symbolism obviously depends very much on the method of election chosen. A simple plurality in a single election, which might assure hegemony to the largest ethnic group, certainly would not work. The Nigerians have attempted to deal *with* the problem in their constitution by dividing the country into relatively large, ethnically homogeneous states and requiring that a presidential candidate gain at least 25 percent of the votes in two-thirds of the states of the Nigerian Federation to assure that he does not represent any particular ethnic group or narrow coalition. The candidate must, therefore, seek support all over the country. A union of any two of the three largest groups behind a single candidate would not be sufficient support to reach the required threshold. The distribution formula assumes a territorial concentration of groups—that is, a certain level of homogeneity within areas but heterogeneity among areas. And: Horowitz. 18&19 “Interethnic and Interreligious Conciliation. Electoral systems that produce proportional results or accountability to constituents or durable governments may or may not foster interethnic conciliation. One way to think about electoral systems and interethnic conciliation is to ask whether a given system provides

necessary to prevent one faction (as a faction) of dominating the executive branch, as, for example would happen if the Shiites, or the Shiites and Kurds joined efforts against Sunnis.³⁰⁴ The percentage of votes must be considered a form of threshold, a threshold that can be calculated according to the number of minorities in the Iraqi provinces. For example, if the percentage of Shiites in the predominantly Sunni Al-Anbar province is 8% and the percentage of Sunnis in the predominantly Shiite Basra province is 10%, then, the threshold should be set to be 11% or more.³⁰⁵

politicians with electoral inducements for moderate behavior ... Similarly, systems that require candidates to achieve a regional distribution of votes, in addition to a national plurality, may foster conciliatory behavior if territory is a proxy for ethnicity because groups are regionally concentrated. Nigeria pioneered this approach in its presidential elections, and now Indonesia has gone in the same direction for its own presidential balloting. On the other hand, electoral systems that allow politicians to be elected without behaving moderately may make post-electoral conciliation more difficult. Coalitions that are created after elections merely to form a government of 50 percent plus one of the seats in parliament may prove to be fragile when divisive ethnic issues arise. So, for interethnic conciliation, the question is how the electoral system affects the pre-electoral calculations of parties and politicians.” & 126 “The Indonesian constitution makers recently opted for a 50- percent-plus-one threshold plus a provincial distribution requirement, thereby making it especially difficult for any candidate to win on the first round if there are several candidates. It is important not to set thresholds for victory so high as to undo the benefits of the system being adopted. Electoral choice, in short, cannot stop at the level of the electoral system alone but must extend to all the details of implementing it so as to gain the benefits of the system that is preferred.”

³⁰⁴ Stone. 365 “the third argument of Madison ... the larger the community, the greater the variety of parties and interests it will contain and the less likely any majority of members will have a common interests or ‘motive to invade the rights of other citizens.’”

³⁰⁵ To prevent an endless loop of electoral rounds, and an eventual stalemate, this system can be emplaced to filter candidates, as a formal—through national elections—substitute to the primaries in US. After the first two rounds, and distilling the candidates down to two, then the system can go back to be a normal majoritarian system. Such a measure is suggested to remove any possible cloaks, and overcome stalemates.

This remedy not only provides people a voice in their government, but will also: (a) by default, institutionalize a veto and give a determining voice to Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds—given Iraq’s demographic and geographic map—in choosing the chief executive; (b) promote moderate elites³⁰⁶ who believe in the strategic objective of OIF and the necessary means to fulfill that objective.³⁰⁷ Candidates who deploy a sectarian or ethnic rhetoric or who are known to have such tendencies will be disqualified at least by voters from other sects and ethnicities.³⁰⁸ As such, “the candidate for the nomination, therefore, consciously or unconsciously acts as an agent of unification in attempting to find the common denominator of agreement among the largest number.”³⁰⁹

Importantly, every candidate will have to appeal to Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish constituents. Median and moderate approaches will most certainly be required to qualify for office and win the elections since the proposed threshold that is central to the proposed re-modification, will force those political actors³¹⁰ to follow the new rules in order to maximize

³⁰⁶ Blais. 247 “makes life tougher for those extremist parties which are the least likely to come to some agreement with other parties ... the majority rule is that a system which produces representatives with strong and broad support and weakens extremist parties is likely to ensure legitimacy and order ... The basic argument is that, because it makes sure that the elected have the clear support of the majority of voters and because it makes it difficult for anti-system parties to be represented, it ensures legitimacy and order, as indicated.”

³⁰⁷ Ibid. 255 such system weakens extremist parties.

³⁰⁸ Kerwin. 148 “a candidate must exercise the greatest of care that he offend no large segment of the population”

³⁰⁹ Ibid. 148.

their share of the votes and secure victory in elections.³¹¹ Equally important, the proposed threshold will either punish those political actors who are purely ideologues by excluding them from attaining office and marginalizing them, thus minimizing their impact,³¹² or force them to adopt and play according to the rules to gain power.³¹³

Over time,³¹⁴ such median approaches will influence the citizenry, establishing mutually reconstituting dynamics between political actors and the citizens. It will also alter “social norms, informal patterns of behavior, and social sanctions,”³¹⁵ and “deep seated habitual patterns of behavior”³¹⁶ wherever and whenever they exist by reshaping such informal rules through the actions of the empowered elites, and their

³¹⁰ Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. 6 “rational choice institutionalism assumes that formal electoral rules have a substantial impact upon the strategic incentives facing politicians, parties, and citizens, so that changing the formal rules has the capacity to alter political behavior.” 7 “the core theoretical claim in rational-choice institutionalism is that formal electoral rules generate important incentives that are capable of shaping and constraining political behavior ... political actors are rational vote-maximizers in pursuit of electoral office who respond strategically to electoral incentives.”

³¹¹ Ibid. 7.

³¹² Ibid. 7, 16, & 17.

³¹³ Ibid. 9 “the Darwinian theory predicts that politicians who are not vote-maximizers, at least to some degree, will gradually become less common, because in general, they will be less successful in gaining elections or re-election.”

³¹⁴ Ibid. 5 “the first ‘founding’ contests held under any revised rules may prove anomalous and unstable, as citizens and parties learn the ropes, but their effects can be assessed more reliable after a decade of elections held under the revised arrangements.” & “reforms ... have a cumulative in the longer term”

³¹⁵ Ibid. 7.

³¹⁶ Ibid. 16.

media campaigns.³¹⁷ “Citizens respond to the alternative electoral strategies adopted by political actors; they also respond directly to electoral rules affecting their role as citizens, with observable consequences evident in mass behavior.”³¹⁸

The greatest challenge to such a system will come from the entrenched elites and the most powerful parties that dominate the Iraqi political arena since, their grip over Iraq will be threatened, their interests jeopardized, and their power endangered.³¹⁹

As for the Iraqi people in general, there is a fact that non-Iraqis seem to overlook: The Iraqi population is sensitive to political figures other than those their sect or ethnicity but only when these figures undertake sectarian and ethnic approaches.³²⁰ With moderates, this problem does not seem to occur,³²¹ as evidenced in the fact that Mithal Al-Alousi, a member of the purely Sunni Al-Alous tribe in Al-Anbar, was elected to parliament by votes of the Shiites in Karbala. Al-Alousi is a stringent critic of Iran’s role in Iraq, at the same time he is a moderate figure with no ethnic or sectarian biases. Furthermore, a significant portion of the Shiite Ayad Allawi’s—the Prime Minister of Iraq during the interim

³¹⁷ Ibid. 7, also see: 17.

³¹⁸ Ibid. 8.

³¹⁹ Hazan. 34 “The perennial debate over the various proposed reforms of Israel’s electoral and political system has been one of the most heated since the establishment of the State, but has essentially remained stalemated because it ran counter to immovable political interests.”

³²⁰ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 96, & 103.

³²¹ Hoagland. Also see: Woodward. 221.

government—votes came from Sunnis in the 2004 transitional elections, and the 2005 elections general election, and in the 2009 provincial elections.³²²

B. Voters must have the say in the Iraqi National assembly. As James Madison stated: “it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration—the legislative—should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.”³²³

There are two options to materialize the above stated imperative: First, direct vote to individual candidates—single member districts system.—Districts are to be represented by a single representative. The personalized vote will oblige representatives to heed to their constituencies’ grievances. This is the only way for candidates to win elections.³²⁴ It will become very clear that a representative owes his/her position to the people and therefore must be attentive to their needs.³²⁵ This will most definitely form a closer relationship between the constituent and the representative.³²⁶ Moreover, it is “easier for voters to know their representatives, to convey to them their views on what the

³²² Rubin, "Secular Parties and Premier Lead in Iraq ".

³²³ Madison. 355 “The Federalist No. 52 - To the People of the State New York.”

³²⁴ Blais. 256.

³²⁵ March and Olsen. 738 direct relation will create transparency that at least will minimize the adverse effects of recurrent political phenomena’s to “Politicians announce public support for positions they fail to defend in private. Legislators vote for legislation while remaining indifferent to its implementation.” In matter that are of vital interest to the constituency, like services essential to life.

³²⁶ Blais. 255 & 256. And Stone. 298.

government should or should not do, and to reward or punish them for their performance”³²⁷

Furthermore, “single-member districts appear to lead to representatives who have stronger constituency orientations and engage in more activities of benefit to their constituencies”³²⁸ where, on the other hand, “multi-member districts are conducive to weaker ties than single-member ones.”³²⁹

Former Prime Minister Allawi supported this form of legislative elections. He called for district-based legislative elections where respective constituencies of a particular district directly elect their representatives.³³⁰ This is preferable to the second option since, it will establish more transparency and accountability.³³¹

There was no need to introduce a proportional system in Iraq in the first place to include Shiite, Sunni, and Kurds in the legislative. It seems those who planned the Iraqi electoral process were indeed experts completely detached from the Iraqi context—even detached from the obvious Iraqi demographic and geographic distribution. Since, given the fact that Kurds are concentrated in the north and inhabitant almost

³²⁷ Blais. 255 & 256. And: Stone 298 “legislators face voters in single-member districts and stand and fall on their individual records.”

³²⁸ Ibid. 256.

³²⁹ Ibid. 256.

³³⁰ Allawi.

³³¹ Blais. 256.

purely three provinces, Sunnis are concentrated in the west and center of Iraq, and Shiites in the south, even majoritarian elections by default, would have included Sunni, Shiites and Kurds in parliament.

Minorities under this system—groups other than Sunni, Shiite, and Kurds—have a personalized vote, where Iraq as a whole will be a single district for them.³³² This will enable these minorities to reach the quota necessary for representation. Also, the dedication of a certain number of seats for women—not less than one-quarter of the members of the Council of Representatives³³³—can follow the same principle.³³⁴ Only then, will women be truly represented, and a group dynamic of women’s movement will start; instead of the 25% minimum quota for participation of women in the Iraqi parliament,³³⁵ that is currently controlled and manipulated by politically motivated fundamentalist groups.³³⁶ Women today are excluded from the decision and policy-making processes.³³⁷ At

³³² Stone. 359 & 360 “in a society where race is an important dividing line and a factor that deeply shape people’s political views, minorities may need representatives of their own race.”

³³³ "Iraqi Constitution", United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf (accessed 04/20/ 2009). Article 49, Fourth.

³³⁴ Stone. 360 “where gender is an important determinant of political power and policy attitudes, men may not adequately represent women.”

³³⁵ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 385.

³³⁶ "The Codepink Report on Iraq: Iraqi Women under Siege ", Act Together <http://www.acttogether.org/codepink.htm#report> (accessed 02/27/ 2009). And: Nancy Trejos, "Women Lose Ground in the New Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 12/16/ 2006. And: Ghali Hassan, "How the U.S. Erase Women’s Rights in Iraq," *Global Research* (2005). <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1054> [accessed 05/05/2009].

best, the participation of women in the Iraqi political process—as it is today—is nominal.³³⁸ The tradeoff appears to be that females who join political entities enjoy the privileges and financial benefits of their posts in exchange for overlooking the gender-biased acts and policies, or acting indifferently towards women’s sufferings.³³⁹ Only such a quota—which provide for women to directly elect their women representatives, rather than risking manipulation of the women’s quota by some political entities—will provide genuine representation for women. Then women will also be able to enjoy the same prospects of legitimacy, and transparency, and at the same time they’ll face the scrutiny of their constituents, as the proposed system provides in general.

The second but less favorable option for elections to the legislative is the open list proportional representation that enables voters to vote for a particular party,³⁴⁰ and at the same time choose from within the party

³³⁷ "Women’s Political Exclusion", Hunt Alternatives Fund http://www.huntalternatives.org/pages/7630_women_s_political_exclusion.cfm?search_term=iraqi_women (accessed 02/27/ 2009). And: Hassan. And: Trejos.

³³⁸ Trejos. And: Hassan. And: "Background on Women's Status in Iraq Prior to the Fall of the Saddam Hussein Government", Human Rights Watch <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/wrd/iraqi-women.htm> (accessed 05/02/ 2009).

³³⁹ Arwa Damon, "Violations of 'Islamic Teachings' Take Deadly Toll on Iraqi Women," *CNN*, 02/08/ 2008. And: "Women's Rights Activist Beheaded in Iraq," *CNN*, 12/18/ 2008. And: "Greater Efforts Needed to Boost Women’s Rights in Iraq, Says Un", U.N. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=30120&Cr=women&Cr1=iraq> (accessed 05/05/ 2009). And: "Unami: Human Rights in Iraq a Concern," *UPI*, 04/29/ 2009.

³⁴⁰ Blais. 248. And: Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. 55 Single Transferable Vote: “Can be classified as proportional because of the use of the quota for election, under this system, each country is divided into multimember constituencies that each have about four or five representatives. Parties forward as

list the candidates they wish to represent them.³⁴¹ This is a compromise that reconciles parties', and voters' interests.³⁴² This system is a compromise between entrenched and strong party elites on one side, and the more accurate representation of voters from the other side.³⁴³ Another advantage of this system is that it entails competition even among party members, which is conducive to democracy.³⁴⁴ However, it is not as transparent as the first choice, and does not entail the same levels of accountability.

To further enhance the balance between voters and strong elites—that might create problems—the presidency council can stay as it is now.³⁴⁵ At present, the presidency council in Iraq—which will give over power to a President in the next elections—consists of a President and two Vice Presidents.³⁴⁶ The presidency council's members are representatives of the three major components of the Iraqi society—Shiite, Sunni, and, Kurd. This can remain unchanged, voted in by

many candidates as they think could win in each constituency. Voters rank their preferences among candidates in an ordinal fashion....”

³⁴¹ Blais.

³⁴² Pierson. 116 to account for the “volatile circumstances” and accommodate entrenched interests. & 137 “layering, ‘... leaving some elements of institutions in place.”

³⁴³ Blais. 249.

³⁴⁴ Ibid. 249 “candidates to attract personal support and to discourage support for other candidates of their party.”

³⁴⁵ Pierson. 116 to account for the “volatile circumstances” and accommodate entrenched interests; 137 “layering, ‘... leaving some elements of institutions in place.”

³⁴⁶ "Iraqi Constitution", (accessed). (Article 138 First, Second, & Fourth).

parliament. In fact, preserving this would form another check on the strong Prime Minister proposed under this system. As such, transparency, accountability, decisiveness, and cohesion, will be combined with oversight. This will also—to restricted extents—preserve the interests of parties and the interests of elites, which will in turn reduce the resistance of these parties and elites to the proposed change.

One issue remains of concern, the number of votes required to elect a representative to the legislature. For, “enlarging too much the number of electors, that renders the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend national objects.”³⁴⁷ This issue must be carefully scrutinized and its remedy calculated to reflect the delicate balance. Districts must be delineated in a way so that candidates will largely compete against people of their-own identity. Hence, candidates will not be able to invoke their identities as credentials to win elections. When possible, it is better for electoral districts to be devised to include a minority of people from diverse ethnic, sectarian, and religious backgrounds. This will foster conciliatory approaches by candidates in mixed districts to maximize their votes.

³⁴⁷ Madison. 63 “The Federalist No. 10 - To the People of the State New York.”

Establishing thresholds and means to ensure unity of action in the Iraqi government was a worry that Condoleezza Rice voiced before the Iraqi political system was designed by the CPA and the UN. She wondered whether the Iraqi electoral system “‘could have vote thresholds’ ... to avoid a future Iraqi parliament splintered into bickering factions.”³⁴⁸ Paul Bremer seconded such a proposition,³⁴⁹ and it is understandable why he did not work to employ such a system. Rather, he went on to institutionalize a system that would promote such “bickering factions.”

³⁴⁸ III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 73.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 73.

Conclusion

Under the current system in Iraq, grievances are rampant. Judged by its outcomes, the implemented system is clearly not functioning.³⁵⁰ The security situation and everything else with it have deteriorated as the political process progressed.³⁵¹ To name only one deficiency, it took several months to form a government³⁵² after both Iraqi national elections³⁵³ since the interests of different factions and parties had to be reconciled.³⁵⁴ Finally, only with American interventions was it possible to bridge the gap between the interests of the elites, and even then, only a government of irreconcilable differences was formed, and a national dispute government emerged. And while the several parties were busy pursuing their narrow interests, the interests of the people were left out. If this time of squabbling, power plays, and maneuverings had been invested in several rounds of elections—the down side of the proposed

³⁵⁰ March and Olsen. 738 “modern perspective in political science has generally given primacy to outcomes and either ignored symbolic actions or seen symbols as part of manipulative efforts to control outcomes, rather than the other way around.” & 741 and: "Iraq Faces 'Tough Challenges' Despite Peaceful Vote", One World <http://us.oneworld.net/article/359913-iraqis-undertake-violence-free-provincial-elections> (accessed 03/01/ 2009).

³⁵¹ Karam. 3 and: Schwarz. 56&57 and: Galbraith. 3 and: Kenneth Katzman, *Crs Report for Congress - Iraq: Government Formation and Performance* (2007). 2

³⁵² Hazan. The same happened in Israel which indicates that the implemented system has something to do with such a shortcoming 27 “Due to the difficulties incurred in the formation of governments in Israel since the end of one-party dominance, especially during the 1980s, attempts at electoral reform finally began to receive serious consideration. Weak government came to be perceived as a possible threat to the continued existence of Israel's democracy.”

³⁵³ Galbraith. 3.

³⁵⁴ Katzman. 2.

system—at least the end result would have been a strong, legitimate, and productive government to serve the interests of the Iraqi people. Moreover, under the current system there is no accountability, because people do not know who represents them—to punish or reward them, or even to protest their grievances to,—nor do even politicians know who they represent, this is why buck passing is the norm that has come to define governance and politics in Iraq.

Today progress in Iraq has been attained by creating government[s] “inside a government.”³⁵⁵ Such a progress has only been achieved through “bypassing”³⁵⁶ formal institutions to overcome fragmentation and relying on undemocratic informal institutions.³⁵⁷ Whether or not one agrees with the proposed system, at least it channels the consolidation of the state and its governance through democratic institutions, and provides for a strong state that is a guarantor for democracy;³⁵⁸ rather than an increasingly stronger state attained at the expense of democratic progress, if not in exchange of authoritarianism.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁵ Abdul-Ahad.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Bunce. 713 “New democracies often exhibit a considerable gap between formal institutions, which meet democratic standards, and informal practices, which do not.”

³⁵⁸ Ibid. 714 “Without rule of law, democracy cannot be fully realized ... A strong state, in short, is a guarantor of democracy—much as it is a guarantor of capitalism.”

³⁵⁹ Abdul-Ahad.

Furthermore, under the current system—even with the closed party list, proportional representation—there are no institutional guarantees and mechanisms to ensure a voice for all the major components of the Iraqi society in choosing the executive. Once the American mediations cease to exist, if one faction cannot reach the two thirds majority requirement—that the Iraqi constitution necessitate to form a government,—³⁶⁰ then this faction can form a government by extending a deal to another faction, completely excluding the third.³⁶¹ For example, Sunni and Shiite blocs in the parliament can agree to form a government and exclude the Kurds, or Kurds and Shiite can agree to form a government and exclude Sunnis. Naturally, this is a recipe for a civil war.

To be sure, the system proposed by this study has shortcomings. It is complex, and, necessitates great efforts and preparations.³⁶² Nevertheless, the efforts and the complexity of the proposed system are insignificant when compared to the human and financial losses in Iraq resulting from the shortcomings of the current system. Even worse, after-all of these human and financial costs Iraq is still not on the right track. For without the life-supporting governance machines—the presence of the MNFI and the imposed benchmarks that attempt to

³⁶⁰ "Iraqi Constitution", (accessed). Article 70 (First) & (Second).

³⁶¹ Ibid., (accessed). Article 70 (First) & (Second), And: Article 76 (First).

³⁶² Kerwin. 151.

enforce spoon-fed concepts like revenue sharing, reconciliation, transparency, etc—the system does not seem to function.³⁶³

The proposed solution is intended to allow for the alteration of elites, and the introduction of new elites through changing the official “rules of the game.”³⁶⁴ It promotes moderates³⁶⁵ that believe in the objectives of the change that took place in Iraq in 2003.³⁶⁶ It also promotes elites with no sectarian and ethnic biases, and thus enables the prevalence of the rule of law,³⁶⁷ rather than patronage.³⁶⁸ As General Peter Pace stated, “absent Iraqi leaders prepared to step up and do hard

³⁶³ "Transcript of President Bush's Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq."

³⁶⁴ Stone. 284 and: Pierson. 10 and: Mettler and Soss. 59 “New institutionalists’ of various stripes explore how institutional arrangements and the “rules of the game” structure the political agenda and shape policy design and enactment ... The literature explains how political rules and preexisting policies shape the actions of public officials and interest groups, but it says little about the ways those same factors influence political thought and action in the citizenry.”

³⁶⁵ Hazan. 28 “It was also hoped that majoritarian elections would help nurture and promote moderate candidates, reduce the extreme multiparty nature of Israel's party system.”

³⁶⁶ "Transcript of President Bush's Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq." “teams bring together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen the moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance.”

³⁶⁷ Allawi. “Building democracy in Iraq ... process, established through the rule of law, a stable security environment, functioning state institutions and an emerging civil society. Success can be achieved if we act soon to bring about the fundamental reforms needed to provide for an Iraqi democracy with a parliament and government that are receptive to people's needs. Only then can we build a country that will finally allow us to enjoy the freedom so many have paid for with their lives.”

³⁶⁸ Dagher, "Iraqi Report on Corruption Cites Prosecutors' Barriers." And: Myers. “ecurity forces, despite significant improvements, remain hobbled by shortages of men and equipment, by bureaucracy, corruption, political interference and security breaches that have resulted in the deaths of dozens of Iraqi and American troops already this year.

things, we can't succeed."³⁶⁹ The proposed system will introduce elites who carry the strategic objective of OIF in their hearts, and who will strive pursue it, with no need for pressures. Thus, democratization and reform in Iraq will be sustainable, and self-reinforcing.

It is very difficult to adequately emphasize the importance of forcing candidates to appeal to cross-factional constituencies, for this will promote moderates and preempt any factional attempt to forge interest-based coalitions. Under the proposed system, it will be imperative for the executive to win-over cross (party, ethnic, and religious) constituencies to ensure maximum consolidation of his or her powers.

The suggested system will force empowered elites to hold accountable all outlaws, sabotages, terrorists, without political, ethnic, and, sectarian meddling—a great hurdle for the coalition efforts in establishing the rule of law,³⁷⁰ and heed to the people's needs.

The proposed system also compensates for the immaturity of the institutions in Iraq that liberal and institutional democracies necessitate. This compensation is actualized by creating direct relations, checks, and

³⁶⁹ Woodward. 265.

³⁷⁰ "Transcript of President Bush's Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq." "In earlier operations, political and sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American forces from going into neighborhoods that are home to those fueling the sectarian violence. This time, Iraqi and American forces will have a green light to enter those neighborhoods." And: Woodward. 256 George Bush's complains to Al-Maliki.

balances among the government branches and most importantly among the governing and the governed.³⁷¹

Governance under such a system is the purest form of democracy,³⁷² where the people are the sovereigns and give a portion of their sovereignty to the government to promote the aggregate interests. The proposed system also allows for the voices, fears, and concerns of all Iraqis—whether Sunni, Shiite, Kurds and/or other minorities—to have a determinant say in their government; in the mean time it allows for unity of command once voters have casted their decision, and allows for the formation of governments that are “adequate to the exigencies”³⁷³ of Iraq.

Such a system, in short, will be the first step and the foundation to form in Iraq “a functioning democracy that polices its territory, upholds the rule of law, respects fundamental human liberties, and answers to its people.”³⁷⁴ The proposed system facilitates completing the transition to democracy in Iraq, and then consolidating it democracy. The current

³⁷¹ Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. 9, 10, 11, 16 & 19. And: Tilly. 11 – 14. And: Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. 8.

³⁷² Blais. 247 “the majority principle is at the heart of democracy.” And: Hazan. 28 “The direct popular election of the Prime Minister was thus adopted in the hope of not only rectifying the faults that had become apparent in the 1980s, but also creating a more stable and efficient system of government. The new system would return the choice of chief executive to the voters, which in itself held intrinsic democratic appeal, and would also grant the Prime Minister both a mandate and legitimacy.”

³⁷³ Solberg. 55 & 59 [Proceedings of the Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government]. See also: 60 & 61 “The Virginia Resolution October 16, 1786;” & 62 “The Delaware Resolution February 3, 1787.”

³⁷⁴ "Transcript of President Bush's Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq."

system also leaves little room for elites to maneuver and thwart the electors' choice, or democracy itself, since interferences for non-democratically elected people will be increasingly difficult.

Very importantly the proposed remedy is a mechanical one.³⁷⁵ For, “there is certainly persuasive evidence that electoral rules have important mechanical effects as they help to determine which candidates are elected to parliament and which parties enter government.”³⁷⁶ Such a mechanical remedy has two advantages: first, it will not induce rejection other kind of intervention stimulate.³⁷⁷ Rather than imposing benchmarks—an imposition that is increasingly unwelcomed by the increasingly assertive Iraqi elites,³⁷⁸—the proposed system sets a path for swift development, through promoting cohesiveness, accountability, and transparency in the Iraqi government, and by devising mechanisms to

³⁷⁵ Stone. 354 & 367 “Mechanic the metaphor suggests taking our policy problems to a mechanic rather than fighting them out in a political contest. By focusing on ends (better for what?) rather than distribution (better for whom/) this approach conceals questions of power. Problems of authority are converted into a matter of technical requirement.” And: 285 “rules are indirect commands that work over time ... rather than being told directly to each person in every situation that the rules cover. They apply to a broad class of actions as ‘standing orders.’” And: Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. 5

³⁷⁶ Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. 5.

³⁷⁷ Marc Santora and Alan Cowell, "With Swipe at U.S., Iraq Builds Ties to French," *The New York Times*, 02/10/2009 2009. “Mr. Maliki ... rebuffed a recent statement by Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. that the United States would have to be ‘more aggressive’ in forcing the Iraqis to reach political reconciliation. ‘The time for putting pressure on Iraq is over,’ Mr. Maliki said in answer to a reporter’s question about Mr. Biden’s remarks. ‘The Iraqi government knows what its responsibilities are. We are carrying out reform, and we are in the last step of reconciliation.’” And: "Iraq's Maliki Says Biden Criticism 'Out of Date'," *Reuters*, 02/10/ 2009.

³⁷⁸ Santora and Cowell. And: "Iraq's Maliki Says Biden Criticism 'Out of Date'."

empower moderate political elites—who believe in these benchmarks as principles—that will voluntarily push forward for such benchmarks. In short, the proposed system will empower elites that are democrats at heart to complete the Iraqi transition democracy and to consolidate this democracy.³⁷⁹ Second, the proposed system possesses the characteristics of “institutional resilience” which make the reforms, and the sustainability they intend to promote, long lasting.³⁸⁰

Electoral arrangements must be adapted to the circumstances of each state.³⁸¹ There are no magic formulas—a one size fit all remedies. The proposed remedy is the swiftest way to introduce a genuine and sustainable democracy in Iraq,³⁸² because it takes into account the specificities of the Iraqis context. Traditional and charismatic authority is an inherent feature of developing societies in general, and Iraq in particular,³⁸³ it is only logical that such a model will promote natural

³⁷⁹ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. 4, 5, 71, & 72.

³⁸⁰ Stone. 355 “based on the metaphor of mechanism: the content of decisions is shaped by the structure of a process in a seemingly automatic fashion.” And: Pierson. 142.

³⁸¹ Paris. 84. And: Gunther. 836 & 837.

³⁸² Solberg. 347 The Preamble of [The Constitution of the United States] ““We the people of the United States ... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” However, the people “in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty and Posterity;” people—by electing representatives of their own choice—with a portion of their sovereignty to carry out the aforementioned tasks.” And: P359 Article VI. [The Constitution of the United States]

born leaders.³⁸⁴ The proposed system introduces democratic systems that rely heavily on the very charismatic factors demanded by the cultural characteristics of developing countries, though, the charismatic Chief Executive will also be accountable to the public. After all, national interest, popularity, and performance will be the factors that enable the Executive to achieve success.³⁸⁵

Taking the opportunity to promote such a proposed system seems timely and appropriate,³⁸⁶ since social actors, and key decision making figures have learned through experimentation, contestation and trial and error that the current system is flawed.³⁸⁷ Furthermore, the convergence of several factors³⁸⁸ has created a “window of opportunity”³⁸⁹ to

³⁸³ Howard J. Wiadra, "Introduction:," in *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, ed. Howard J. Wiadra (Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2002). 6.

³⁸⁴ "The Presidentialization of Contemporary Democratic Politics: Evidence, Causes, and Consequences." 3 the natural focus on the highest elective office and implies that all aspects of the electoral process are decisively molded by the personalities of the leading candidates."

³⁸⁵ Ibid. 28 and 30.

³⁸⁶ Hoagland. And: Jim Muir, "Democracy Takes Root in Iraq," *BBC*, 02/08/ 2009.

³⁸⁷ Colin J Bennetii and Micahel Howleti, "The Lessons of Learning: Reconciling Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change," *Policy Sciences* 25 no. 3 (1992). 277, 288 & 290. And: March and Olsen. 736 "Aggregate behavior in a group can be defined as the consequence of the interlocking of trial-and-error learning occurring at the individual level." And: III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 20 "Too often, Iraq's elected representatives treat the ministries as political spoils. Many ministries can do little more than pay salaries." Woodward. 187, 188, 191, 200, & 223 Lee Hamilton's statement "we have a government that cannot govern or that has not governed in Iraq."

³⁸⁸ Pierson. 12 "conjunctures—interaction effects between distinct causal sequences that become joined at particular point in time." And: Hall and Taylor. 942 "junctures."

promulgate forward such a proposal. These factors are: (a) the shift in American focus from mainly military and security aspects to an approach that focuses more on political reforms, (b) the calls from several current and former Iraqi elites for a political reform, and (c) the strong indication that the Iraqi general public is prone for a stronger, and, nationalistic government.³⁹⁰

However, the changes will face opposition by the same political elites that this proposal would oust.³⁹¹ Therefore, external shock

³⁸⁹ John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, Second Edition ed. (Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc. , 2003). 1. And: Pierson. 134 & 135 “brief moments in which opportunities for major institutional reforms appear.”

³⁹⁰ "Iraq's Winning Vote." “Last weekend's vote, which occurred during one of the calmest periods Iraq has experienced since the U.S. invasion, was a political triumph. Though results are still preliminary, they show that voters strongly rewarded Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for his forceful action against extremist militias and his secular nationalist agenda—and punished religious parties perceived as too sectarian or too close to Iran. The nonsectarian alliance of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi also appears to have done well, and nationalist Sunnis gained influence in areas where they had lacked it because of previous election boycotts. In short, Iraq appears to have taken a step toward becoming the moderate Arab democracy that the Bush administration long hoped for.” And: Rubin, "Secular Parties and Premier Lead in Iraq ". “The relative success of the secular parties may be a sign that a significant number of Iraqis are disillusioned with the religious parties that have been in power but have done little to deliver needed services. Well-known incumbent parties also did well ... Maithem Hussein, the head of a nongovernment organization tracking the election in Basra, said Mr. Maliki's victory there was expected. “Maliki has saved Basra from militias,” he said. “Basra owes him.” ... Several politicians said the strong showing by Mr. Allawi's party was notable. “This really reflects that Iraqi society is looking for alternatives — they do not necessarily believe that the Islamists should lead the country,” said Qassim Daoud, a member of Parliament and one of the leaders of an independent, secular-leaning party. “The public are interested in services, and this election has shown them that they can change anything by democratic means if they are not satisfied.” And: Zelikow, (accessed). “Incidentally, this means that Maliki's old party, Dawa, is molting its old shell and becoming the new ‘state of law’ party, standing for nationalism, central power, and modern services.” And: Yacoub. “For years, al-Maliki himself had a reputation as a hard-line Shiite nationalist. But there are signs the public, especially in Baghdad and other major cities, has grown weary of the religious parties that have dominated national politics since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.”

³⁹¹ Hazan. 25 “When it became apparent that the adoption of constituency-based electoral methods, distorting pure proportionality in order to attain effective

(perhaps better translated as American intervention) will be necessary.³⁹² Admittedly, this interventional role has a moral aspect as well as a functional one since the system was imposed—not against the wish of Iraqi people, but because of their lack of experience.

The longer it takes to realize the need to reform the political and electoral process to achieve the initial objectives of OIF, the “more resilient” these institutions will become, and the harder it will be to introduce the necessary reforms.³⁹³ If such changes are not pushed forward soon, the opportunity might be “irretrievably lost.”³⁹⁴

Failure in Iraq is not an option, not only for Iraqis but also for America.³⁹⁵ The importance of succeeding in Iraq transcends respective party cleavages and different presidential approaches.³⁹⁶ Even though

government, was not politically possible, the chances for the second reform package diminished.” & 26 “However, the direct election of the Prime Minister would have to overcome several political hurdles before its passage.” And: Horowitz. 126&127 “Although I have just spoken of ‘the system that is preferred,’ not all participants will necessarily prefer the same system. Those advantaged by the status quo will tend to prefer it, while those disadvantaged by it may prefer various alternatives.”

³⁹² Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. 76

³⁹³ Pierson. 147.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.* 11.

³⁹⁵ *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*, (National Security Council (NSC), 2005). 1 and: “President Bush Addresses Nation on Iraq War,” *The Washington Post*, 01/10/ 2007. “one message came through loud and clear: Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States.” And: III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. 339.

³⁹⁶ III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 8 “Because of the gravity of Iraq’s condition and the country’s vital importance, the United States is facing one of its most difficult and significant international challenges in decades.” 9 “Iraq is vital to regional and even global stability.” And: Biddle, O’Hanlon, and Pollack. 27.

the American public opinion may be against such a policy of commitment to Iraq, sustaining the policy of commitment to winning the war in Iraq while modifying the approach to win the war is vital to the short and long-term US interests.³⁹⁷ In short, this issue is as vital for America as it is for Iraq.³⁹⁸ The sacrifices will be appreciated—by both Iraqis and Americans—once the strategic objective of OIF is attained. From here on, this study will summarize the important reasons that explain why attaining the strategic objective of OIF is vital to Americans—as it has shown how attaining the strategic objective of OIF is vital for the interests of Iraqis. Commitment to Iraq is a vital matter for American for at least three reasons:

First, the security of the United States is at stake and is correlated to the victory in Iraq. In recent history, America abandoned Afghanistan, leaving it unstable. The consequences were that Afghanistan became a den for terrorists who used the state as a platform for attacks directed against America and its allies. The attacks resulted in the loss of

³⁹⁷ III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 9 “Iraq is critical to U.S. interests ... Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy, influencing how the United States is viewed in the region and around the world.” 28 “The global standing of the United States could suffer if Iraq descends further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and strain on, U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial capacities.” And: Biddle, O’Hanlon, and Pollack. 30

³⁹⁸ III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 27 “If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world.”

thousands of American lives, not to mention the financial losses and the loss of America's sense of security.³⁹⁹

Losing the war in Iraq would be far more consequential.⁴⁰⁰ Iraq is strategically located in the heart of the Middle East; possesses enormous resources; and is of high cultural, historical, and, religious value to Muslims.⁴⁰¹ These considerations would make losing the war in Iraq catastrophic.⁴⁰²

If America cuts and runs from Iraq, then Iraq will fall into the hands of the enemies of the US.⁴⁰³ This will give those who hate America a strategic location, enormous resources, and a strong case to mobilize Muslims around the world against America.⁴⁰⁴

³⁹⁹ *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*. 13.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.* 5.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.* 5 “A safe haven for terrorists as Afghanistan once was, only this time in some of the world's most strategic territory, with vast natural resources to exploit and to use to fund future attacks.”

⁴⁰² Woodward. 211, 212, 259 Condoleezza Rice's concerned voiced to the former President Bush “its going to be the end of American power in the Middle East ... 60-plus years of American influence in the Gulf ... were very much at risk.” & 295 Robert Gate's remarks “America must not fail because the regional consequences would be too severe.”

⁴⁰³ Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 30.

⁴⁰⁴ *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*. 1 “Iraq would become a safe haven from which terrorists could plan attacks against America, American interests abroad, and our allies.” And: Woodward. 237 David Gordon the representative from the Intelligence community's opinion.

Second, securing America's energy necessitates that the US stays the course in Iraq until Iraq is completely stable, and democratic. The importance of Iraq in this regard can be summarized as follows:

- I. America, according to the most optimistic estimates will not be able to achieve energy independence in less than ten years. Hence, independence from the Middle East will not be attained on the short and mid-term. Therefore, the strategic vitality of the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular will continue to be a pressing issue,⁴⁰⁵ even to enable America and Americans to carry on their daily lives (see *figure 4*).⁴⁰⁶
- II. The oil peak is estimated to occur within a few years if, as some calculate, it has not already occurred. The US is the largest consumer of oil in the world; it imports 25% of the world's oil production. Iraq, on the other hand, has oil resources, the second proven oil reserves.⁴⁰⁷ To

⁴⁰⁵ James A. Russell, "Strategy, Security, and War in Iraq: The United States and the Gulf in the 21st Century," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18, no. 2 (2005). P290 "In 2003, the Gulf states produced about 22.9 million barrels of oil per day, accounting for 27% of the world's total. Approximately 15-15.5 million barrels of oil per day transits out of the Gulf through the 34-mile-wide Strait of Hormuz, making the waterway an important pressure point in the world's economy. The region contains an estimated 715 billion barrels in proven oil reserves, representing 57% of the world's totals and most of the world's excess production capacity. Nearly 40% of the world's natural gas reserves also reside in the region. The world promises to become even more dependent on Gulf state oil producers over the next 25 years. By 2025, the Energy Information Administration estimates that the Persian Gulf producers will be exporting 36.4 million barrels of oil per day, more than doubling their current exports of nearly 17 million barrels per day (Energy Information Administration 2004)."

⁴⁰⁶ "Petroleum Basic Statistics ", Energy Information administration - Official Energy Statistics from the US Government <http://www.eia.doe.gov/basics/quickoil.html> (accessed 15/01/ 2009).

make it more interesting, reports indicate that there are untapped, newly found oil reserves in Iraq.⁴⁰⁸ The finding triples the estimates of Iraqi oil reserves and places Iraq as the world's wealthiest country in terms of oil reserves.⁴⁰⁹

Globally, the demand on oil is soaring, and supply is limited; the competition over oil resources is escalating,⁴¹⁰ and is destined to become more and more heated.⁴¹¹ The rising demand on energy resources is a strategic threat to the US. Therefore, the United States needs to secure access to the world's oil supplies. Otherwise, the US will have to fight much bloodier wars—all out wars—under far less favorable

⁴⁰⁷ III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 9 and: Michael Schwartz, "Why Did We Invade Iraq Anyway?", Global Policy Forum <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/justify/2007/1030whyiraq.htm> (accessed).

⁴⁰⁸ Muir. Iraq dramatically increased the official size of its oil reserves yesterday after new data suggested that they could exceed Saudi Arabia's and be the largest in the world. The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister told *The Times* that new exploration showed that his country has the world's largest proven oil reserves, with as much as 350 billion barrels. The figure is triple the country's present proven reserves and exceeds that of Saudi Arabia's estimated 264 billion barrels of oil. Barham Salih said that the new estimate had been based on recent geological surveys and seismic data compiled by "reputable, international oil companies . . . This is a serious figure from credible sources."

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid. Iraq dramatically increased the official size of its oil reserves yesterday after new data suggested that they could exceed Saudi Arabia's and be the largest in the world. The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister told *The Times* that new exploration showed that his country has the world's largest proven oil reserves, with as much as 350 billion barrels. The figure is triple the country's present proven reserves and exceeds that of Saudi Arabia's estimated 264 billion barrels of oil. Barham Salih said that the new estimate had been based on recent geological surveys and seismic data compiled by "reputable, international oil companies . . . This is a serious figure from credible sources."

⁴¹⁰ Ingolf Kiesow, "Quest for Oil and Geostrategic Thinking," *The China And Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 3, no. 3 (2005). 11 In the case of oil, the rising demand posed by China and India and to a lesser degree Europe poses a strategic threat to the US.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

circumstances.⁴¹² Thus, the vitality of Iraqi-American friendly relations becomes apparent.⁴¹³ To maintain such relations—friendly relations,—a democratic Iraq, where moderates, as opposed to fundamentalists are leveraged, is also apparent.

Third, Iraq is demographically, historically, and culturally, linked to the whole Middle East region.⁴¹⁴ Any failure in Iraq will have a domino effect throughout the region.⁴¹⁵ And since the Middle East is a vital yet very volatile region,⁴¹⁶ any destabilization will disrupt energy supplies to the world, and spike security threats,⁴¹⁷ for, the three major

⁴¹² John Judis, "Determining Factor: Oil and U.S. Diplomacy", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18276&prog=zgp&proj=zusr> (accessed).

⁴¹³ Hoagland. The "Carter Doctrine": Persian Gulf oil was "vital" to American national interests and that the U.S. would use "any means necessary, including military force" to sustain access to it. To assure that "access," he announced the creation of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, a new military command structure that would be able to deliver personnel from all the armed services, together with state-of-the-art military equipment, to any location in the Middle East at top speed.

⁴¹⁴ Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 30.

⁴¹⁵ III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 6 "Neighboring countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread." 28 "countries in the region fear significant violence crossing their borders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene to protect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a broader regional war. Turkey could send troops into northern Iraq to prevent Kurdistan from declaring independence. Iran could send in troops to restore stability in southern Iraq and perhaps gain control of oil fields. The regional influence of Iran could rise at a time when that country is on a path to producing nuclear weapons ... Such a broader sectarian conflict could open a Pandora's box of problems—including the radicalization of populations, mass movements of populations, and regime changes—that might take decades to play out. If the instability in Iraq spreads to the other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm the global economy ... Terrorism could grow ... " and: Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 30 and: Woodward. 235.

⁴¹⁶ *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*. 1 "The fate of the greater Middle East – which will have a profound and lasting impact on American security – hangs in the balance."

oil producers in the world are in the Middle East, and the largest portion of the world's oil supplies comes from the Middle East (*see figure 5*).⁴¹⁸

Over and above, pentagon strategists have defined the “arc of crisis” that stretches from “Central and South America and spreads through North Africa, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia.” This arc defines the primary threat to US security in the 21st century.⁴¹⁹ The Middle East is this arc's “central core. Its strategic position is unequalled ... it holds in its subsoil about three-fourths of the proven and estimated world oil reserves, and it is the locus of one of the most intractable conflicts of the twentieth century”⁴²⁰ Iraq lies in the heart of the Middle East and, is the second largest Arab country in the Gulf in terms of territory and oil reserves. Thus, losing Iraq would constitute a fatal strike to American security, economy, and status in world.

Furthermore, it is very important to keep in mind that the most important strategy to counterterrorism is to dry the pool of terrorists' supporters, sympathizers, and, recruits. Losing Iraq would produce the

⁴¹⁷ Ibid. 4 “What happens in Iraq will influence the fate of the Middle East for generations to come, with a profound impact on our own national security. Ceding ground to terrorists in one of the world's most strategic regions will threaten the world's economy and America's security, growth, and prosperity, for decades to come.” And: Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 28.

⁴¹⁸ Risley and Sisk.

⁴¹⁹ George Lenczowski, “The Arc of Crisis: Its Central Sector”, Council of Foreign Relations <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19790301faessay9917/george-lenczowski/the-arc-of-crisis-its-central-sector.html> (accessed). And: Russell. 294.

⁴²⁰ Lenczowski, (accessed).

exact opposite and give a major boost to the terrorists' cause⁴²¹ for two reasons: *First*, Terrorists always emphasize that this is a war of believers and non-believers,⁴²² and cite their victory over the mighty Soviet Union.⁴²³ As such, terrorists keep insuring their supporters and sympathizers that there is no reason to believe that America also will not be defeated, just as the Soviets.⁴²⁴ If such a scenario comes true, then the terrorists' way of life and thinking will resonate with many more Arabs and Muslims as the true way,⁴²⁵ the way that all the other regimes, and approaches, failed to achieve.⁴²⁶ "Al Qaeda will portray any

⁴²¹ III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 6 "Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand its base of operations."

⁴²² *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*. 4 "Osama Bin Laden has declared that the 'third world war...is raging' in Iraq, and it will end there, in "either victory and glory, or misery and humiliation." ... Bin Laden's deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri has declared Iraq to be 'the place for the greatest battle,' where he hopes to "expel the Americans" and then spread "the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq." ... Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had openly declared that 'we fight today in Iraq, and tomorrow in the Land of the Two Holy Places, and after there the west.'" And: "Bin Laden: America 'Filled with Fear'", CNN <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/10/07/ret.binladen.transcript/> (accessed 04/03 2008).

⁴²³ *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*. 6 "Since 1998, Al Qaida has repeatedly cited Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia, as examples to encourage more attacks against America and our interests overseas."

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.* 5 "Placed the American people in greater danger by destabilizing a vital region, weakening our friends, and clearing the way for terrorist attacks here at home. The terrorists will be emboldened in their belief that America cannot stand and fight, but will cut and run in the face of adversity." & 6 "Called into question American credibility and commitment in the region and the world. Our friends and foes alike would doubt our staying power, and this would damage our efforts to counter other security threats and to advance other economic and political interests worldwide."

⁴²⁵ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. 75 "most of the world (with the important exception of a reinvigorated fundamentalism in the Islamic cultural community)—was such that there were no major ideological contestations to democracy as a political system."

failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant victory, one that will be featured prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region and around the world.”⁴²⁷ Hence, their ideology will spread like fire in hay.⁴²⁸ *Second*, Iraq lies in the heart of the Middle East. Its capital, Baghdad, was the capital of the largest Arabic/Islamic Caliphate. Many Muslims around the world carry strong sentiments for Iraq. The holiest shrines to Shiite Muslims are in Iraq. Terrorists rally supporters by emphasizing the intentions of Americans as harboring dubious goals towards the Islamic world, and that it intends to divide and weaken the Muslim world.⁴²⁹ Hence, if Iraq fails as a state and shatters into pieces, extremists will use this as a proof to the Muslim world that America harbors the worst intentions towards Muslims, and targets the holiest and most intimate places to Muslims. These groups will have a very strong case, backed by evidence, to mobilize Muslims from around the world⁴³⁰ against the West in general and the US in particular. Terrorists

⁴²⁶ III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 28 “A chaotic Iraq could provide a still stronger base of operations for terrorists who seek to act regionally or even globally. Al Qaeda will portray any failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant victory that will be featured prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region and around the world. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy to Osama bin Laden, has declared Iraq a focus for al Qaeda: they will seek to expel the Americans and then spread “the jihad wave.”

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.* 28.

⁴²⁸ *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*. 5 “a decisive victory over the United States, vindicating their tactics of beheadings, suicide bombings, and ruthless intimidation of civilians, inviting more deadly attacks against Americans and other free people across the globe.”

⁴²⁹ III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 31.

will be able to rally people against any policy that America ever seeks to pursue in the Muslim world and in the vital region of the Middle East. Consequently, the United States will never be able to mobilize a single soldier or have a hope for success in the Islamic world,⁴³¹ nor will it be able to advance any policy after failing in Iraq and failing it. On the other hand, if the US abandons Iraq before the transition is completed, and democracy is consolidated; then, even if Iraq remains a single unit, it will fall in the hands of fundamentalist groups that will not only enslave⁴³² Iraqis and jeopardize their prospects for decent life,⁴³³ freedom,⁴³⁴ liberty,⁴³⁵ and democracy,⁴³⁶ but will also be extremely hostile to the United States.

⁴³⁰ Ibid. 31 Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such a division would confirm wider fears across the Arab world that the United States invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state.

⁴³¹ Ibid. 28 “Perceived failure there could diminish America’s credibility and influence in a region that is the center of the Islamic world and vital to the world’s energy supply. This loss would reduce America’s global influence.” And: *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*. 1 “Middle East reformers would never again fully trust American assurances of support for democracy and human rights in the region – a historic opportunity lost.” & 5 “A failed state and source of instability for the entire Middle East, with all the attendant risks and incalculable costs for American security and prosperity.” & 6 “Weakened the growing democratic impulses in the region. Middle East reformers would never again fully trust American assurances of support for democracy and pluralism in the region – a historic opportunity, central to America’s long-term security, forever lost.”

⁴³² Greene. 424 & 425 “A New Prospect in Human Affairs”: Richard Price, “Observation on the importance of the American Revolution” (1784). “... the consequences will be, that the fairest experiment ever tried in human affairs will miscarry; and that a REVOLUTION which had revived the hopes of good men and promised an opening to better times, will become a discouragement to all future efforts in favour of liberty, and prove only an opening to a new scene of human degeneracy and misery.”

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

Hence, imagine, if you will, the disruption of petroleum supplies from this region coupled with a much more terrorist-friendly environment, and a hatred towards America. This pretty much defines the future of events if the US fails to attain the strategic objective of OIF in Iraq. Reverse the picture, however, and imagine a stable and prospering Iraq. Imagine what the triumph of democracy over extremism would mean for American foreign policy and its acceptance, especially in a region where the people are hanging in the balance, awaiting for a way out of their suffering, into a way of life that improves their status.

President Obama campaigned against American presence in Iraq. He has maintained that he “will responsibly end the war in Iraq and focus on Afghanistan, the refuge for the terrorists who attacked us on September 11.” However, terrorists are not tied to a land or restricted by nationality. Their threat is transnational. Therefore, if Iraq is neglected it will be much more devastating since terrorists will then have a strong hold in the Middle East, specifically in a country so resourceful and strategically located. In such a scenario, the impact of the Afghan-Arab phenomena and the September 11 attacks will be minor compared with what could happen if Iraq becomes a safe haven for terrorists. America, will then have to return to Iraq under less favorable circumstances just as they did in Afghanistan. As such, this study have tried to summarize

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

the reasons, why America, to serve its own interests—that also coincide with Iraqi national interests as shown throughout this study—must maintain its commitment to Iraq until the strategic objective of OIF is materialized.

Finally, people must not lose sight of the fact that Iraq is still in transition from dictatorship. Transitions are not cakewalks; they are thorny and complicated processes.⁴³⁷ It has been six years since the overthrow of Saddam's regime and the transition from dictatorship. Six years is shorter time period than the actual allied occupation of Japan, which took seven years.⁴³⁸ America has a moral responsibility towards a country inhabited by 27 million citizens, for it responsible for forcing the change that took place in Iraq.⁴³⁹

⁴³⁷ O'Donnell and Schmitter. 3-6, & 10.

⁴³⁸ Sodaro. 267.

⁴³⁹ III and others, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. 9 "Because events in Iraq have been set in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States has both a national and a moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy." And: William R. Slomanson, *Fundamental Perspectives on International Law*, 5th ed. (Thomson Wadsworth, 2007). 271-273. Also see: Robert Kagan, "Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, C. 1776", *World Affairs Journal* <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/2008%20-%20Spring/full-neocon.html> (accessed). "Washington Post/ABC News poll in April 2003 found that, ... more than 70 percent of Americans supported the war, and a CBS poll revealed that 60 percent of Americans believed it had been worth the sacrifice even if no weapons of mass destruction were ever found. A month later, a Gallup poll found that 79 percent of Americans considered the war justified with or without conclusive evidence that Saddam Hussein had possessed weapons of mass destruction, and only 19 percent believed the discovery of such weapons was necessary to justify the war. The nation's political leaders were similarly supportive up to that point. The key vote in the Senate in the fall of 2002 passed 77-23, with 29 of 50 Democrats voting to authorize the war." And: "Floor Speech of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton on S.J. Res. 45, a Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq, October 10, 2002", Senator Hillary




Figure 1




Figure 2

Rodham Clinton http://clinton.senate.gov/speeches/iraq_101002.html (accessed 08/10/ 2008).





Figure 3

Top Consuming Countries, 1960-2006



Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec11_20.pdf

Figure 4

Crude Oil Reserves of the World*

In Billions of Barrels




Figure 5

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